Hello Readers,
If you are coming to the website to find information about my dissertation survey, please see the post that will point you to all the pages you need. Otherwise, please read on about this post's discussion topic "In Tech We Trust" (no need to click anywhere, just scroll).
This week's post was prompted by a recent New York Times article by Elisabeth Rosenthal. The article highlighted America's technological optimism, the belief that given time and effort a technological fix can solve just about any problem we might get ourselves into. Ms. Rosenthal focuses on the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, and she indicates that this event is a potential turning point away from America's blind optimism in technology.
She also points to Carbon Capture and Storage technologies (often referred to as CCS), which are being heralded by the coal industry as its future source environmental sustainability, as well as past technological fixes such as the "green revolution" in agriculture and vaccines for childhood diseases. However, she ends on the recent situation where an Icelandic volcano brought air travel over Europe to a literal standstill for several weeks. Overall, the message that Americans (and much of the rest of the world) continue to be absurdly confident in the ability of technological innovation to overcome the forces of nature that make our lives difficult (e.g. volcanoes, viruses, drought) is pretty clear.
However, I would like to ask about technology's ability to overcome our own habits and social expectations. The BP oil spill is an easy example to pick on, so I will use that. At this point, it is very easy to point to BP executives and managers and tell them they should have been more vigilant, more prudent, and more safety-conscious. And to make it clear: yes, they should have been!
Recently, the media has been pointing to BP's poor accident record and safety violations. However, I would be curious to see if any of the other oil companies have been doing any better or if BP is really a rogue oil company that was taking chances where no one else would. For some reason I am skeptical of the latter case.
In fact, I am particularly skeptical, because I have a hard time believing that BP is particularly exceptional in its expectation (or PR statements) that there was no way that anything would go so wrong that it could not be fixed. On the contrary, I think BP is the rule rather than the exception.
Take a moment to think about it. (I'll probably get some sampling bias on a blog like this, but...) Please take some time to answer these questions for yourself.
Do you believe/expect that man-made climate change is occurring (or will occur in your lifetime)?
Have you drastically changed your personal habits to prevent it from getting worse?
Have you taken action to ensure your community/state/country is doing all it can to prevent climate change from getting worse?
Do you expect that by the time things get really bad energy technology and other industries will have caught up with us and solved the problem?
If you are being honest with yourself (and you are American and you've read this far through my blog), your answers were probably "Yes", "Well, sort of", "I voted for that liberal candidate, does that count?", and "Yes". I realize that I'm generalizing, so I am likely not 100% accurate, but the point I'm trying to make is that we need to question our faith in the certainty of technological fixes. It seems as though technology has been keeping pace for so long, we as a society have stopped questioning it.
Although, it has not happened in recent historical memory, it is possible that unchecked social forces (read as expectations) can outpace technology and lead to societal downfall. Of course, in the age of globalization it is important to remember that there are several other unpleasant steps between where we are now and complete failure, so it is important not to see this as an all or nothing game.
On the other hand, I am not in favor of technological pessimism either. I do not think that the advancement of technology will necessarily result in a doomsday scenario. Instead, I would like to advocate a middle ground. In this middle ground, rather than relying on technology as a future fix for the problems we are creating today, we shape our society in a responsible manner that only relies upon what we already know we have.
We need to use an ex ante approach to technological solutions (i.e. mitigation using current and developing technologies) as much as possible rather than an ex post approach (i.e. expecting technology will allow us to adapt later). While simultaneously moderating our social habits and expectations until technology catches up with us in a manner that minimizes environmental damage. Otherwise, we will continue to build an environmental debt in addition to the current economic deficit we are running.
At this point, I would like to note that I am not suggesting which means of 'enforcement' is the most appropriate. I am an ardent believer in taking responsibility for your own actions. However, I recognize that in actuality that is not sufficient to ensure social progress, so I will leave this last point as an open-ended question: what will be necessary to move society from a blind to a cautious optimism in technology?
Thank you for your time!
Sean Diamond
Monday, May 31, 2010
Monday, May 24, 2010
Survey Release!
Hello Readers,
Today I am distributing the survey for my dissertation. I will be sending out the survey via email to contacts that I have already found. Also, I have posted information about my dissertation and the survey on this website. Here is a list of links you can use to find out about the survey:
Thank you for your time and interest!
Sincerely,
Sean Diamond
Today I am distributing the survey for my dissertation. I will be sending out the survey via email to contacts that I have already found. Also, I have posted information about my dissertation and the survey on this website. Here is a list of links you can use to find out about the survey:
- The Dissertation Proposal
This page will help you understand a little bit about why I am doing what I am doing in my dissertation. - The Introduction Letter
This page is useful for potential survey participants (people and companies that work with electric utility companies and energy storage technologies). - The Survey
This page provides a preview of the survey and offers instructions for participating in the survey.
Thank you for your time and interest!
Sincerely,
Sean Diamond
Saturday, May 15, 2010
US-China Assignment
Hello Reader,
In this post I present to you one of the essays I completed as part of my coursework. Please note that this essay was turned in on 18th March 2010, so some of the remarks in the conclusion are already a bit dated. For example, "the current political gridlock" in Washington has moved beyond the national healthcare debate; however, it has yet to actually reach a culminating point on climate change and energy! On the other hand, a new version of legislation is gaining some traction and the EPA has released its new rules for greenhouse gas emissions permits.
I hope you enjoy my academic musings...
“Compare the roles of China and the USA in the development of global climate policy”
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States and China are consistently recognized as the world’s leading emitters of greenhouse gases. Thus, they will necessarily play an integral role in the success or failure of the development of any global climate policy efforts. However, a cursory inspection of either country’s economic, political, and social structures and issues will make it evident that for either country to successfully draft (and subsequently ratify and enact) a domestic climate change policy would be no small measure. Let alone the effort required to develop a useful global climate change policy that would simultaneously satisfy both countries and the rest of the world. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that attempts to do so have been fraught with difficulty.
This essay compares the roles that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States of America (US) have played and will likely play in the development of global climate change policies.
To do so coherently, the topic has been broken into a contextual section, a contemporary section, and a conclusion section. The contextual section looks at the internal structure of each country, the role that each country has played in the Kyoto Protocol process (from its initial agreement through to its implementation in 2005), and the issue of embodied emissions in international trade, which has been largely avoided in global climate negotiations to date. The contemporary section is split into two subsections. The first addresses the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) to which both countries have been active partners since its inception in 2006. The second focuses on the events leading up to and since the Copenhagen conference. Finally, the conclusion section briefly speculates on upcoming developments surrounding the US and China with regard to global climate change policies.
II. CONTEXTUAL
1. US INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS & INFRASTRUCTURE
Up until very recently the United States has long held the title of the world’s largest GHG emitter with net annual emissions well over 6 GT of CO2e with the vast majority (>85%) of emissions coming from the energy sector (UN FCCC 2008). This is not surprising based on the breakdown of primary energy sources in the US: petroleum 37.1%, natural gas 23.8%, and coal 22.5% (EIA 2008). Thus, any climate change policy developments must be designed to contend with a US infrastructure that is largely developed and reliant upon fossil fuels.
The structure of the US federal government, notably the separation of powers amongst the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, combined with the bipartisan nature of the American political system means that the negotiation, ratification, and ultimate implementation of any (global or domestic) climate change policy will necessarily be a difficult process. In the case of a global rather than a domestic policy, an extra layer of complication is introduced in that the President (or likely members of the State Department) is responsible for negotiating the policy, while the ratification of the policy (enacting it as law) is the responsibility of Congress, before responsibility is handed back to the executive branch (likely the Environmental Protection Agency and several other departments) for enforcement. All the while, other political discussions and quarrels in Congress have the potential (proven empirically time and again) to derail or delay meaningful action with regard to climate change policy.
While the US federal government has yet to enact any statutorily binding climate change policy (international or otherwise), it does offer a number of financial incentives that promote the implementation of renewable energy and energy-efficient technologies (e.g. incentives offered in the Energy Policy Act of 2005). Also, significant progress has been made on other levels (e.g. state, corporate, and NGO).
In fact, according to the U.S. DOE (2009), “24 states plus the District of Columbia that have [legally binding Renewable Portfolio Standards] policies in place”, which require renewable energy to account for 10-33% of the energy produced in the enacting state with deadlines ranging from 2015-2030. At a corporate level, the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) offers a legitimate GHG emissions trading forum for companies operating in North America (e.g. Ford Motor Company, Rolls-Royce, DuPont, and Sony Electronics, Inc.). The CCX members “make a voluntary but legally binding commitment to meet annual GHG emission reduction targets” (CCX 2007, quotation in original formatting). Furthermore, entire sectors in the US, notably that of higher education, have begun to champion the cause of stabilizing GHG emissions through their own actions without waiting for regulation. A prime example of this is the 675 higher education institutions that are signatories to the American College & University Presidents Climate Commitment, which obligates its members to establish a methodology and deadline for achieving climate neutral operations (ACUPCC 2010).
Thus, despite the United States’ apparent floundering in the international policy arena of climate change, the country is relatively well positioned to take action on the issue. However, without coherent federal leadership, the US will likely have a difficult time fostering the diplomatic prestige that the EU appears to have in the climate policy arena.
2. CHINESE INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS & INFRASTRUCTURE
With estimates of the exact date varying, it is widely accepted that the People’s Republic of China has recently overtaken the US as the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases. The Pew Center on Global Climate Change (2007) estimates that China’s emissions have grown by about 80% since 1990. Similar to the US, this is not surprising considering that 65% of China’s energy consumption is met with coal (Pew 2007) and China is the second largest consumer of oil behind the US (EIA 2009). It is especially unastounding given China’s record economic growth over the past decade.
Unlike the multi-branch nature of the US federal government, the Chinese national governance of energy and climate policy has a complexity of its own variety. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) of the PRC is at least ostensibly the primary controller of China’s climate change policies and published China’s National Climate Change Programme (NDRC 2007), which is a comprehensive overview of China’s national stance regarding and response to climate change issues.
However, Downs (2008) explains that policy direction from the NRDC by no means ensures action with interference from external and internal parties (e.g. private energy industry companies and high-ranking members of the Chinese Communist Party respectively) being a regular occurrence. Furthermore, the introduction of the purportedly understaffed National Energy Administration (NEA) in the PRC government muddles the issue of responsibility regarding enacting and enforcing energy- and climate-related policies (Downs 2008).
NEA, which was established in March 2008, is now supposed to be responsible for key areas (e.g. development and planning, international cooperation, and general administration of energy policy) related to negotiating any international climate change policy. Yet, the NEA does not have the authority to adjust energy prices, an authority which is still held by the NRDC (Downs 2008). Thus, the PRC seems to be mired in bureaucratic turf battles that have an overall derailing and delaying effect that could be likened to the United States’ issues at the federal level.
Finally, it is important to note that as a non-Annex I country China has no formal obligation to reduce its emissions under the Kyoto Protocol to which it is a ratified signatory. However, in China’s National Climate Change Programme (CNCCP), the NRDC (2007) repeated refers to China as a country of responsibility, which means that it will work toward reducing the carbon intensity of its economy. In other words, China is actively attempting to increase its quantity of economic output measured in GDP per ton of CO2e emitted annually through a variety of energy, transportation, forestry, and industrial management schemes (Pew Center 2007). Also, the wording of the CNCCP makes it fairly clear that China expects much of its future mitigation to be driven by technological advancement rather than major economic shifts (NRDC 2007). Of course, with China’s economy growing at roughly 10 percent per annum over the past two decades with little signs of slowing, it is likely that China’s overall GHG emissions will continue to grow in spite of its efficiency efforts (Wang and Watson 2008).
3. HISTORICAL (KYOTO – 2005)
For better or worse, the negotiation of global climate change policy over the past decade has been centered around the clarification and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The primary tenants of Kyoto involved securing reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from Annex I countries (i.e. developed or industrialized nations) while allowing non-Annex I countries freedom to develop as a form of equity (Bolin 1998).
Since the initial agreement, virtually all of the roughly 200 nations that participated in the negotiations have ratified the Kyoto Protocol with the notable exception of the US. The protocol has spurred the EU to develop a mandatory GHG emissions trading scheme. It also fostered approximately 1400 cost-effective Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects to reduce GHG emissions in non-Annex I countries, of which half are hosted by China (Taplin and McGee 2010). Despite these generally encouraging successes, Kyoto has many criticisms.
As Bolin (1998) pointed out, the targets and timelines for action in the protocol were set out by the policymakers with a limited understanding of the inertia of the climate system; therefore, even in 1998 Bolin expected that additional international efforts would be required prior to 2010.
Instead of relying upon science for strict guidance, Kyoto was developed based largely around political feasibility and international acceptability. It offered generous allowances to the transitional economies (e.g. the former USSR) and offered special exceptions to Australia, Iceland, New Zealand, and Norway (Bolin 1998). Furthermore, Kellow (2010) explains that by choosing the 1990 baseline for emissions countries such as the United Kingdom and Germany were asked to make smaller commitments than might have otherwise been chosen, which were indirectly passed onto the rest of the EU under the European Burden Sharing Agreement.
Regardless of the merits and shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol at the time of the signing, the end result is that neither the US nor China have realized any attributable, real reductions in GHG emissions due to the agreement. In 2001 the US under the Bush administration fully withdrew from its commitment to Kyoto, which was at least partly due to lack of reductions commitments from non-Annex I countries. Meanwhile, China, which was not required to make any GHG reduction commitments as a non-Annex I country, has only nominally participated in the agreement by participating in the CDM program, and it has been argued that much of China’s dubious CDM participation is likely not actually beneficial with regard to mitigating climate change (Kellow 2010).
4. EMBODIED EMISSIONS IN TRADE ISSUES
Though the topic of GHG emissions embodied in internationally traded goods has been generally avoided by policymakers and policy negotiators attempting to gain a consensus, it has received attention from the academic community (e.g. Wang and Watson 2007, 2008 and Peters and Hertwich 2008), and its inclusion in policy discussions has the potential to radically shift the tone of global climate change policy efforts. In fact, Peters and Hertwich (2008) suggest that international trade may be one of the most decisive issues in climate policy.
Furthermore, at least as far back as the Reagan administration in the 1980s, the US has put an emphasis on trade in its foreign policy by working with various degrees of alacrity to open up global and regional trade with partners in the Western hemisphere, the Pacific, and Asia through free trade agreements (Barfield 2009). Also, China’s net exports account for around 23% its total annual GHG emissions for 2004 (Wang and Watson 2007).
Thus, emissions embodied in trade seem to warrant special attention of its own, particularly in the context of US and Chinese influence on global climate policy. Unfortunately, with the US being a net importer (imports accounted for 7.3% of annual GHG emissions) and China being a net exporter (exports accounted for 17.8% of annual GHG emissions) of GHG emissions simultaneously (Peters and Hertwich 2008) it is likely that the two countries will disagree regarding whom should take responsibility for emissions: the producer or the consumer. Yet, Wang and Watson (2007) and Peters and Hertwich (2008) indicate that leaving the issue unresolved in global climate change negotiations will likely lead to an inefficient and/or ineffective policy with the potential for “carbon leaking” (i.e. industries moving from regulated to unregulated, carbon-intensive economies). This outcome could be damaging to both the environment and economic stability in the long-term.
III. CONTEMPORARY
1. ASIA-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (2006 – PRESENT)
In July of 2005 Australia, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, China, and the US, which were later joined by Canada in 2007, developed a vision statement for a non-binding partnership focused on promoting sustainable development and addressing climate change issues (Kellow 2010). The result was formation of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) at a ministerial meeting in January of 2006 in Sydney (APP 2006a).
The APP (2006a) Charter describes an organization designed to share technical and policy information through public-private partnerships such that each of the member countries can build their own capacity to implement clean development technologies and environmental programs. The APP (2006b) Work Plan explains that the work of the APP will be done through industrial/governmental task forces that will research and explore bottom-up approaches. The task forces are divided into eight key sectors: (1) cleaner fossil energy; (2) renewable energy and distributed generation; (3) power generation and transmission; (4) steel; (5) aluminium; (6) cement; (7) coal mining; and (8) buildings and appliances (APP 2006b). The concept of task forces appears to be particularly novel to the APP in comparison to other international climate change policy alternatives, and its research and development focus has the potential to open up new connections between industry professionals and researchers in different countries (Aldy et al 2003).
Academically, there seem to be two primary schools of thought regarding the APP: those that see the APP as a distraction that detracts from the Kyoto Protocol (e.g. Taplin and McGee 2010) and those that see the APP as a useful alternative or supplement to the short-comings of the Kyoto Protocol (e.g. Kellow 2010). Taplin and McGee (2010) argue that – despite the clause inserted at the request of Japan within the APP Charter indicating otherwise – the structure of the APP is irreconcilable with one of the primary tenants of the UN FCCC (i.e. common but differentiated responsibilities) and is designed to undermine current climate governance. However, it could easily be argued that the APP was created due to the poor design of Kyoto.
Kellow (2010) believes that the APP is an excellent exercise in ‘mini-lateralism’ that avoids the least common denominator effect of global negotiations by limiting the discussion to a few key countries. Some of the least common denominator effects that the APP avoid include the lack of action by major developing nations and binding international commitments that are extremely difficult to enact and enforce (i.e. abutting against the infrastructural constraints described in the contextual section above).
While it is clear that the APP’s focus on improving carbon intensity rather than absolute GHG emission reductions is a weaker means of mitigating the causes of climate change (Taplin and McGee 2010), the APP by no means precludes – in fact it at least nominally encourages – nations to develop climate change policies that result in absolute reductions. Also, Taplin and McGee’s (2010) suggestion that the APP promotes a sense of inequity by forcing major developing nations (e.g. China) to take action now seems to be largely missing the point. This is especially the case considering China is voluntarily participating in the APP and the US federal government was able to address climate change through a back door during a time period when it was politically unfeasible to enter through the front. And, even though it was probably not designed with this in mind, the APP also allowed the US some freedom toward the end of the Bush administration when according to Barfield (2009) many political figures would not consent to any program associated with the out-going president.
2. PRE/POST-COPENHAGEN
This section is designed to look at the adjustments, political wrangling, preparations, and fall out of the Copenhagen conference in December of 2009 and address the impacts that the US and China have had on the process and each other. It should be noted that due to the extremely recent nature of this topic the spread of academic literature to date is relatively sparse, and this section should be read as such.
Almost any sampling of national US press coverage in 2009 will likely make it clear that newly-seated President Obama was the center of attention. The lead up to the Copenhagen conference was hardly different though the president naturally shared the limelight with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Congress, and surprisingly the US Supreme Court. In Congress, the Waxman-Markey bill, which is otherwise known as the American Clean Energy and Security Act and proposes a ‘cap-and-trade’ system along side a national 20% renewable energy standard, was introduced in the house in July of 2009 (Pelosi et al 2009).
Though the bill was not signed into law prior to the Copenhagen conference – and actually has yet to do so – the US federal government did begin to act to address climate change in 2009. This was made possible thanks to a finding by the EPA, in response to a 2007 ruling by the Supreme Court, that GHGs were a threat to public health and the environment and were therefore subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act, which was initially developed to combat the causes of acid rain and other types of air pollutants (EPA 2007). Unfortunately, this finding did not carry enough momentum to warrant a total shift in United States’ negotiating policy at Copenhagen or lead directly to setting GHG emissions reductions targets. However, the EPA (2007) does recognize it as a pivotal first step in forcing the US federal government to acknowledge and address climate change.
Since Copenhagen, the US news media have not focused significantly on developments in US climate change policy. Instead the primary focus has been on the reform of healthcare legislation, which has been championed by President Obama throughout the beginning of 2010. China on the other hand has been the center of attention with regard to climate change policy since Copenhagen.
Building upon its efforts in the run up to Copenhagen, such as the research, clean coal, and energy efficiency goals outlined in the joint statement by NEA and the IEA (2009), China has made the news for its climate policies a number of times since Copenhagen. The Associated Press (2010) reported in early March that China is in the process of drafting a 10 year green energy plan. The report included a goal of 15% renewable energy by 2020, similar to its earlier commitment in the NEA and IEA (2009) joint statement; however, the report cited an additional goal of decreasing the carbon intensity of the Chinese economy by 40-45% by 2020 (Associated Press 2010).
IV. CONCLUSION
With the recent Chinese announcement about its forthcoming 10 year plan and recognition that China has overtaken the US as the world’s largest investor in renewable energies (van Loon 2010), the US is swiftly losing the arguments that led to the stagnation of the Kyoto Protocol. These developments could have a range of implications for United States climate and clean energy policies. Factor in the EPA ruling mentioned above, and it is likely that Congress will have little choice to act before the end of 2010. Otherwise, the EPA will be compelled to regulate GHG emissions without further guidance and even the most staunchly conservative Republicans may have difficulty explaining why China is taking the lead on global energy policy while the US is falling behind. At this point the main inhibitor to addressing climate change policy in the US may be the current political gridlock surrounding the national healthcare debate.
Once the US takes some domestic action, and assuming that the NEA and NRDC continue along their predetermined path, it is possible that the two countries that were previously doing the least to address climate change will end up doing the most even it is simply a matter of scale. China has been on a research and development dependent path even prior to the release of the CNCCP (NRDC 2007). The US has a smattering of potential advantages as outlined in the contextual section and is currently on a path toward some version of a Cap-and-Trade based system of governance (Pew Center 2010).
It seems that both countries could stand to benefit from additional emphasis on and funding toward the APP. If this occurs in combination with one (more likely the US) or both countries setting targets for actual GHG emissions reductions or even especially stringent measures to improve carbon intensity, the need for a global climate change policy may fall by the wayside much to the chagrin of EU leaders. Thus, the rest of the world would have to make due with the US and China doing something rather than everything promised in Kyoto and patch together several regionalized policies.
This vision may not sound like a global ideal, but it certainly does seem more reasonable and pragmatic given the current circumstances outlined throughout this essay. Furthermore, a regionalized approach and a breakdown of the post-Kyoto mindset may allow other issues such as emissions embodied in international trade to creep into the global climate policy forum. It certainly seems like such an issue is more pertinent to a global climate regime than universal (or OECD-based) emissions targets since it deals with the interplay between countries and cannot be built upon multiple domestic policies.
In summary, US and China have differing superficial needs, constraints, and goals in the climate policy realm, but ultimately their mutual drive for economic growth and current reliance on fossil fuels result in a similar set of policy aims. As such, it is likely that the US and China (and the competition and cooperation between them) will continue to push global climate change policy towards a more fragmented and regionalized system of governance in the near future.
For reference list please see the accompanying post.
In this post I present to you one of the essays I completed as part of my coursework. Please note that this essay was turned in on 18th March 2010, so some of the remarks in the conclusion are already a bit dated. For example, "the current political gridlock" in Washington has moved beyond the national healthcare debate; however, it has yet to actually reach a culminating point on climate change and energy! On the other hand, a new version of legislation is gaining some traction and the EPA has released its new rules for greenhouse gas emissions permits.
I hope you enjoy my academic musings...
“Compare the roles of China and the USA in the development of global climate policy”
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States and China are consistently recognized as the world’s leading emitters of greenhouse gases. Thus, they will necessarily play an integral role in the success or failure of the development of any global climate policy efforts. However, a cursory inspection of either country’s economic, political, and social structures and issues will make it evident that for either country to successfully draft (and subsequently ratify and enact) a domestic climate change policy would be no small measure. Let alone the effort required to develop a useful global climate change policy that would simultaneously satisfy both countries and the rest of the world. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that attempts to do so have been fraught with difficulty.
This essay compares the roles that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States of America (US) have played and will likely play in the development of global climate change policies.
To do so coherently, the topic has been broken into a contextual section, a contemporary section, and a conclusion section. The contextual section looks at the internal structure of each country, the role that each country has played in the Kyoto Protocol process (from its initial agreement through to its implementation in 2005), and the issue of embodied emissions in international trade, which has been largely avoided in global climate negotiations to date. The contemporary section is split into two subsections. The first addresses the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) to which both countries have been active partners since its inception in 2006. The second focuses on the events leading up to and since the Copenhagen conference. Finally, the conclusion section briefly speculates on upcoming developments surrounding the US and China with regard to global climate change policies.
II. CONTEXTUAL
1. US INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS & INFRASTRUCTURE
Up until very recently the United States has long held the title of the world’s largest GHG emitter with net annual emissions well over 6 GT of CO2e with the vast majority (>85%) of emissions coming from the energy sector (UN FCCC 2008). This is not surprising based on the breakdown of primary energy sources in the US: petroleum 37.1%, natural gas 23.8%, and coal 22.5% (EIA 2008). Thus, any climate change policy developments must be designed to contend with a US infrastructure that is largely developed and reliant upon fossil fuels.
The structure of the US federal government, notably the separation of powers amongst the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, combined with the bipartisan nature of the American political system means that the negotiation, ratification, and ultimate implementation of any (global or domestic) climate change policy will necessarily be a difficult process. In the case of a global rather than a domestic policy, an extra layer of complication is introduced in that the President (or likely members of the State Department) is responsible for negotiating the policy, while the ratification of the policy (enacting it as law) is the responsibility of Congress, before responsibility is handed back to the executive branch (likely the Environmental Protection Agency and several other departments) for enforcement. All the while, other political discussions and quarrels in Congress have the potential (proven empirically time and again) to derail or delay meaningful action with regard to climate change policy.
While the US federal government has yet to enact any statutorily binding climate change policy (international or otherwise), it does offer a number of financial incentives that promote the implementation of renewable energy and energy-efficient technologies (e.g. incentives offered in the Energy Policy Act of 2005). Also, significant progress has been made on other levels (e.g. state, corporate, and NGO).
In fact, according to the U.S. DOE (2009), “24 states plus the District of Columbia that have [legally binding Renewable Portfolio Standards] policies in place”, which require renewable energy to account for 10-33% of the energy produced in the enacting state with deadlines ranging from 2015-2030. At a corporate level, the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) offers a legitimate GHG emissions trading forum for companies operating in North America (e.g. Ford Motor Company, Rolls-Royce, DuPont, and Sony Electronics, Inc.). The CCX members “make a voluntary but legally binding commitment to meet annual GHG emission reduction targets” (CCX 2007, quotation in original formatting). Furthermore, entire sectors in the US, notably that of higher education, have begun to champion the cause of stabilizing GHG emissions through their own actions without waiting for regulation. A prime example of this is the 675 higher education institutions that are signatories to the American College & University Presidents Climate Commitment, which obligates its members to establish a methodology and deadline for achieving climate neutral operations (ACUPCC 2010).
Thus, despite the United States’ apparent floundering in the international policy arena of climate change, the country is relatively well positioned to take action on the issue. However, without coherent federal leadership, the US will likely have a difficult time fostering the diplomatic prestige that the EU appears to have in the climate policy arena.
2. CHINESE INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS & INFRASTRUCTURE
With estimates of the exact date varying, it is widely accepted that the People’s Republic of China has recently overtaken the US as the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases. The Pew Center on Global Climate Change (2007) estimates that China’s emissions have grown by about 80% since 1990. Similar to the US, this is not surprising considering that 65% of China’s energy consumption is met with coal (Pew 2007) and China is the second largest consumer of oil behind the US (EIA 2009). It is especially unastounding given China’s record economic growth over the past decade.
Unlike the multi-branch nature of the US federal government, the Chinese national governance of energy and climate policy has a complexity of its own variety. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) of the PRC is at least ostensibly the primary controller of China’s climate change policies and published China’s National Climate Change Programme (NDRC 2007), which is a comprehensive overview of China’s national stance regarding and response to climate change issues.
However, Downs (2008) explains that policy direction from the NRDC by no means ensures action with interference from external and internal parties (e.g. private energy industry companies and high-ranking members of the Chinese Communist Party respectively) being a regular occurrence. Furthermore, the introduction of the purportedly understaffed National Energy Administration (NEA) in the PRC government muddles the issue of responsibility regarding enacting and enforcing energy- and climate-related policies (Downs 2008).
NEA, which was established in March 2008, is now supposed to be responsible for key areas (e.g. development and planning, international cooperation, and general administration of energy policy) related to negotiating any international climate change policy. Yet, the NEA does not have the authority to adjust energy prices, an authority which is still held by the NRDC (Downs 2008). Thus, the PRC seems to be mired in bureaucratic turf battles that have an overall derailing and delaying effect that could be likened to the United States’ issues at the federal level.
Finally, it is important to note that as a non-Annex I country China has no formal obligation to reduce its emissions under the Kyoto Protocol to which it is a ratified signatory. However, in China’s National Climate Change Programme (CNCCP), the NRDC (2007) repeated refers to China as a country of responsibility, which means that it will work toward reducing the carbon intensity of its economy. In other words, China is actively attempting to increase its quantity of economic output measured in GDP per ton of CO2e emitted annually through a variety of energy, transportation, forestry, and industrial management schemes (Pew Center 2007). Also, the wording of the CNCCP makes it fairly clear that China expects much of its future mitigation to be driven by technological advancement rather than major economic shifts (NRDC 2007). Of course, with China’s economy growing at roughly 10 percent per annum over the past two decades with little signs of slowing, it is likely that China’s overall GHG emissions will continue to grow in spite of its efficiency efforts (Wang and Watson 2008).
3. HISTORICAL (KYOTO – 2005)
For better or worse, the negotiation of global climate change policy over the past decade has been centered around the clarification and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The primary tenants of Kyoto involved securing reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from Annex I countries (i.e. developed or industrialized nations) while allowing non-Annex I countries freedom to develop as a form of equity (Bolin 1998).
Since the initial agreement, virtually all of the roughly 200 nations that participated in the negotiations have ratified the Kyoto Protocol with the notable exception of the US. The protocol has spurred the EU to develop a mandatory GHG emissions trading scheme. It also fostered approximately 1400 cost-effective Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects to reduce GHG emissions in non-Annex I countries, of which half are hosted by China (Taplin and McGee 2010). Despite these generally encouraging successes, Kyoto has many criticisms.
As Bolin (1998) pointed out, the targets and timelines for action in the protocol were set out by the policymakers with a limited understanding of the inertia of the climate system; therefore, even in 1998 Bolin expected that additional international efforts would be required prior to 2010.
Instead of relying upon science for strict guidance, Kyoto was developed based largely around political feasibility and international acceptability. It offered generous allowances to the transitional economies (e.g. the former USSR) and offered special exceptions to Australia, Iceland, New Zealand, and Norway (Bolin 1998). Furthermore, Kellow (2010) explains that by choosing the 1990 baseline for emissions countries such as the United Kingdom and Germany were asked to make smaller commitments than might have otherwise been chosen, which were indirectly passed onto the rest of the EU under the European Burden Sharing Agreement.
Regardless of the merits and shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol at the time of the signing, the end result is that neither the US nor China have realized any attributable, real reductions in GHG emissions due to the agreement. In 2001 the US under the Bush administration fully withdrew from its commitment to Kyoto, which was at least partly due to lack of reductions commitments from non-Annex I countries. Meanwhile, China, which was not required to make any GHG reduction commitments as a non-Annex I country, has only nominally participated in the agreement by participating in the CDM program, and it has been argued that much of China’s dubious CDM participation is likely not actually beneficial with regard to mitigating climate change (Kellow 2010).
4. EMBODIED EMISSIONS IN TRADE ISSUES
Though the topic of GHG emissions embodied in internationally traded goods has been generally avoided by policymakers and policy negotiators attempting to gain a consensus, it has received attention from the academic community (e.g. Wang and Watson 2007, 2008 and Peters and Hertwich 2008), and its inclusion in policy discussions has the potential to radically shift the tone of global climate change policy efforts. In fact, Peters and Hertwich (2008) suggest that international trade may be one of the most decisive issues in climate policy.
Furthermore, at least as far back as the Reagan administration in the 1980s, the US has put an emphasis on trade in its foreign policy by working with various degrees of alacrity to open up global and regional trade with partners in the Western hemisphere, the Pacific, and Asia through free trade agreements (Barfield 2009). Also, China’s net exports account for around 23% its total annual GHG emissions for 2004 (Wang and Watson 2007).
Thus, emissions embodied in trade seem to warrant special attention of its own, particularly in the context of US and Chinese influence on global climate policy. Unfortunately, with the US being a net importer (imports accounted for 7.3% of annual GHG emissions) and China being a net exporter (exports accounted for 17.8% of annual GHG emissions) of GHG emissions simultaneously (Peters and Hertwich 2008) it is likely that the two countries will disagree regarding whom should take responsibility for emissions: the producer or the consumer. Yet, Wang and Watson (2007) and Peters and Hertwich (2008) indicate that leaving the issue unresolved in global climate change negotiations will likely lead to an inefficient and/or ineffective policy with the potential for “carbon leaking” (i.e. industries moving from regulated to unregulated, carbon-intensive economies). This outcome could be damaging to both the environment and economic stability in the long-term.
III. CONTEMPORARY
1. ASIA-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (2006 – PRESENT)
In July of 2005 Australia, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, China, and the US, which were later joined by Canada in 2007, developed a vision statement for a non-binding partnership focused on promoting sustainable development and addressing climate change issues (Kellow 2010). The result was formation of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) at a ministerial meeting in January of 2006 in Sydney (APP 2006a).
The APP (2006a) Charter describes an organization designed to share technical and policy information through public-private partnerships such that each of the member countries can build their own capacity to implement clean development technologies and environmental programs. The APP (2006b) Work Plan explains that the work of the APP will be done through industrial/governmental task forces that will research and explore bottom-up approaches. The task forces are divided into eight key sectors: (1) cleaner fossil energy; (2) renewable energy and distributed generation; (3) power generation and transmission; (4) steel; (5) aluminium; (6) cement; (7) coal mining; and (8) buildings and appliances (APP 2006b). The concept of task forces appears to be particularly novel to the APP in comparison to other international climate change policy alternatives, and its research and development focus has the potential to open up new connections between industry professionals and researchers in different countries (Aldy et al 2003).
Academically, there seem to be two primary schools of thought regarding the APP: those that see the APP as a distraction that detracts from the Kyoto Protocol (e.g. Taplin and McGee 2010) and those that see the APP as a useful alternative or supplement to the short-comings of the Kyoto Protocol (e.g. Kellow 2010). Taplin and McGee (2010) argue that – despite the clause inserted at the request of Japan within the APP Charter indicating otherwise – the structure of the APP is irreconcilable with one of the primary tenants of the UN FCCC (i.e. common but differentiated responsibilities) and is designed to undermine current climate governance. However, it could easily be argued that the APP was created due to the poor design of Kyoto.
Kellow (2010) believes that the APP is an excellent exercise in ‘mini-lateralism’ that avoids the least common denominator effect of global negotiations by limiting the discussion to a few key countries. Some of the least common denominator effects that the APP avoid include the lack of action by major developing nations and binding international commitments that are extremely difficult to enact and enforce (i.e. abutting against the infrastructural constraints described in the contextual section above).
While it is clear that the APP’s focus on improving carbon intensity rather than absolute GHG emission reductions is a weaker means of mitigating the causes of climate change (Taplin and McGee 2010), the APP by no means precludes – in fact it at least nominally encourages – nations to develop climate change policies that result in absolute reductions. Also, Taplin and McGee’s (2010) suggestion that the APP promotes a sense of inequity by forcing major developing nations (e.g. China) to take action now seems to be largely missing the point. This is especially the case considering China is voluntarily participating in the APP and the US federal government was able to address climate change through a back door during a time period when it was politically unfeasible to enter through the front. And, even though it was probably not designed with this in mind, the APP also allowed the US some freedom toward the end of the Bush administration when according to Barfield (2009) many political figures would not consent to any program associated with the out-going president.
2. PRE/POST-COPENHAGEN
This section is designed to look at the adjustments, political wrangling, preparations, and fall out of the Copenhagen conference in December of 2009 and address the impacts that the US and China have had on the process and each other. It should be noted that due to the extremely recent nature of this topic the spread of academic literature to date is relatively sparse, and this section should be read as such.
Almost any sampling of national US press coverage in 2009 will likely make it clear that newly-seated President Obama was the center of attention. The lead up to the Copenhagen conference was hardly different though the president naturally shared the limelight with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Congress, and surprisingly the US Supreme Court. In Congress, the Waxman-Markey bill, which is otherwise known as the American Clean Energy and Security Act and proposes a ‘cap-and-trade’ system along side a national 20% renewable energy standard, was introduced in the house in July of 2009 (Pelosi et al 2009).
Though the bill was not signed into law prior to the Copenhagen conference – and actually has yet to do so – the US federal government did begin to act to address climate change in 2009. This was made possible thanks to a finding by the EPA, in response to a 2007 ruling by the Supreme Court, that GHGs were a threat to public health and the environment and were therefore subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act, which was initially developed to combat the causes of acid rain and other types of air pollutants (EPA 2007). Unfortunately, this finding did not carry enough momentum to warrant a total shift in United States’ negotiating policy at Copenhagen or lead directly to setting GHG emissions reductions targets. However, the EPA (2007) does recognize it as a pivotal first step in forcing the US federal government to acknowledge and address climate change.
Since Copenhagen, the US news media have not focused significantly on developments in US climate change policy. Instead the primary focus has been on the reform of healthcare legislation, which has been championed by President Obama throughout the beginning of 2010. China on the other hand has been the center of attention with regard to climate change policy since Copenhagen.
Building upon its efforts in the run up to Copenhagen, such as the research, clean coal, and energy efficiency goals outlined in the joint statement by NEA and the IEA (2009), China has made the news for its climate policies a number of times since Copenhagen. The Associated Press (2010) reported in early March that China is in the process of drafting a 10 year green energy plan. The report included a goal of 15% renewable energy by 2020, similar to its earlier commitment in the NEA and IEA (2009) joint statement; however, the report cited an additional goal of decreasing the carbon intensity of the Chinese economy by 40-45% by 2020 (Associated Press 2010).
IV. CONCLUSION
With the recent Chinese announcement about its forthcoming 10 year plan and recognition that China has overtaken the US as the world’s largest investor in renewable energies (van Loon 2010), the US is swiftly losing the arguments that led to the stagnation of the Kyoto Protocol. These developments could have a range of implications for United States climate and clean energy policies. Factor in the EPA ruling mentioned above, and it is likely that Congress will have little choice to act before the end of 2010. Otherwise, the EPA will be compelled to regulate GHG emissions without further guidance and even the most staunchly conservative Republicans may have difficulty explaining why China is taking the lead on global energy policy while the US is falling behind. At this point the main inhibitor to addressing climate change policy in the US may be the current political gridlock surrounding the national healthcare debate.
Once the US takes some domestic action, and assuming that the NEA and NRDC continue along their predetermined path, it is possible that the two countries that were previously doing the least to address climate change will end up doing the most even it is simply a matter of scale. China has been on a research and development dependent path even prior to the release of the CNCCP (NRDC 2007). The US has a smattering of potential advantages as outlined in the contextual section and is currently on a path toward some version of a Cap-and-Trade based system of governance (Pew Center 2010).
It seems that both countries could stand to benefit from additional emphasis on and funding toward the APP. If this occurs in combination with one (more likely the US) or both countries setting targets for actual GHG emissions reductions or even especially stringent measures to improve carbon intensity, the need for a global climate change policy may fall by the wayside much to the chagrin of EU leaders. Thus, the rest of the world would have to make due with the US and China doing something rather than everything promised in Kyoto and patch together several regionalized policies.
This vision may not sound like a global ideal, but it certainly does seem more reasonable and pragmatic given the current circumstances outlined throughout this essay. Furthermore, a regionalized approach and a breakdown of the post-Kyoto mindset may allow other issues such as emissions embodied in international trade to creep into the global climate policy forum. It certainly seems like such an issue is more pertinent to a global climate regime than universal (or OECD-based) emissions targets since it deals with the interplay between countries and cannot be built upon multiple domestic policies.
In summary, US and China have differing superficial needs, constraints, and goals in the climate policy realm, but ultimately their mutual drive for economic growth and current reliance on fossil fuels result in a similar set of policy aims. As such, it is likely that the US and China (and the competition and cooperation between them) will continue to push global climate change policy towards a more fragmented and regionalized system of governance in the near future.
For reference list please see the accompanying post.
US-China Assignment - References
These are the references I used for my assignment comparing the roles of China and the US in development of global climate policy, which can be found in the accompanying post.
ACUPCC (American College & University Presidents Climate Commitment) 2010: American College & University Presidents Climate Commitment Website,, Last Accessed 16 March 2010.
Aldy, J.E., S. Barrett, and R.N. Stavins, 2003: “Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures”, KSG Working Paper Series No. RWP03-012; FEEM Working Paper No. 64,, 1-39.
APP (Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate), 11-13 January 2006a: Charter, Sydney, 1-7.
APP (Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate), 11-12 January 2006b: Work Plan, Sydney, 1-8.
Associated Press, 2 March 2010: “Report: China drafts 10-year ‘green energy’ plan”, Business Week, Bloomberg L.P., Shanghai,, Last Accessed 17 March 2010.
Barfield, C., 2009: “Politics of Trade in the USA and in the Obama Administration: Implications for Asian Regionalism”, Asian Economic Policy Review, 4, 227-243.
Bolin, B., 1998: “The Kyoto Negotiations on Climate Change: A Science Perspective”, Science, 279, 330-331,.
CCX (Chicago Climate Exchange, Inc.), 2007: “Overview”, Chicago Climate Exchange Website,, Last Accessed 16 March 2010.
DOE (Department of Energy for the United States), 2009: “States with Renewable Portfolio Standards”, Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy State Activities and Partnerships Website,, Last Accessed 16 March 2010.
Downs, E.S., 2008: “China’s “New” Energy Administration: China’s National Energy Administration will struggle to manage the energy sector effectively”, The China Business Review Online, The US-China Business Council, November-December Issue,42-45.
EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration), 2008: “Figure 2.0: Primary Energy Consumption by Source and Sector”, Annual Energy Review 2008,, Last Accessed 16 March 2010.
EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration), 2009: “China: Oil”, Country Analysis Briefs Website,, Last Accessed 16 March 2010.
EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency), 7 December 2009: “EPA: Greenhouse Gases Threaten Public Health and the Environment / Science overwhelmingly shows greenhouse gas concentrations at unprecedented levels due to human activity”, U.S. EPA Website: News Releases issued by the Office of Air and Radiation,, Last Accessed 17 March 2010.
Kellow, A., 2010: “Is the Asia-Pacific Partnership a viable alternative to Kyoto?”, WIREs Climate Change, 1, 10-15.
NEA (National Energy Administration of the People’s Republic of China) and IEA (International Energy Agency), 2009: “Joint Statement by the National Energy Administration of the People’s Republic of China and the International Energy Agency”, Paris, 1-5.
NRDC (National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China), 2007: China’s National Climate Change Programme, 1-62.
Peters, G.P. and E.G. Hertwich, 2008: “CO2 Embodied in International Trade with Implications for Global Climate Policy”, Environmental Science & Technology, 42(5), 1401-1407.
Pelosi (Offices of Speaker Pelosi), Leader Hoyer, the Energy and Commerce Committee, and the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, 2009: “Building the Clean Energy Economy”,, Last Accessed 17 March 2010, 1-44.
Pew Center (on Global Climate Change), 2007: “Climate Change Mitigation Measures in the People’s Republic of China”, 1-4.
Pew Center (on Global Climate Change), 2010: “Carbon Market Design & Oversight: A Short Overview”, 1-15.
Taplin, R. and J. McGee, 2010: “The Asia-Pacific Partnership: implementation challenges and interplay with Kyoto”, WIREs Climate Change, 1, 16-22.
UN FCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), 2008: Report of the individual review of the greenhouse gas inventory of the United States of America submitted in 2007, 1-37.
United States, House of Representatives, 109th Congress, H.R. 6: Energy Policy Act of 2005 (introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives; 5 August 2005), 109th Congress,, Last Accessed 16 March 2010.
van Loon, J., 17 March 2010: “Renewable Energy Investment May Reach $200 Billion in 2010”, Business Week, Bloomberg L.P.,, Last Accessed 17 March 2010.
Wang, T. and J. Watson, 2007: “Who Owns China’s Carbon Emissions?”, Tyndall Briefing Note No. 23, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, 1-7.
Wang, T. and J. Watson, 2008: “Carbon Emissions Scenarios for China to 2100”, Tyndall Working Paper No. 121, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, 1-23.
ACUPCC (American College & University Presidents Climate Commitment) 2010: American College & University Presidents Climate Commitment Website,
Aldy, J.E., S. Barrett, and R.N. Stavins, 2003: “Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures”, KSG Working Paper Series No. RWP03-012; FEEM Working Paper No. 64,
APP (Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate), 11-13 January 2006a: Charter, Sydney, 1-7.
APP (Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate), 11-12 January 2006b: Work Plan, Sydney, 1-8.
Associated Press, 2 March 2010: “Report: China drafts 10-year ‘green energy’ plan”, Business Week, Bloomberg L.P., Shanghai,
Barfield, C., 2009: “Politics of Trade in the USA and in the Obama Administration: Implications for Asian Regionalism”, Asian Economic Policy Review, 4, 227-243.
Bolin, B., 1998: “The Kyoto Negotiations on Climate Change: A Science Perspective”, Science, 279, 330-331,
CCX (Chicago Climate Exchange, Inc.), 2007: “Overview”, Chicago Climate Exchange Website,
DOE (Department of Energy for the United States), 2009: “States with Renewable Portfolio Standards”, Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy State Activities and Partnerships Website,
Downs, E.S., 2008: “China’s “New” Energy Administration: China’s National Energy Administration will struggle to manage the energy sector effectively”, The China Business Review Online, The US-China Business Council, November-December Issue,42-45.
EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration), 2008: “Figure 2.0: Primary Energy Consumption by Source and Sector”, Annual Energy Review 2008,
EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration), 2009: “China: Oil”, Country Analysis Briefs Website,
EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency), 7 December 2009: “EPA: Greenhouse Gases Threaten Public Health and the Environment / Science overwhelmingly shows greenhouse gas concentrations at unprecedented levels due to human activity”, U.S. EPA Website: News Releases issued by the Office of Air and Radiation,
Kellow, A., 2010: “Is the Asia-Pacific Partnership a viable alternative to Kyoto?”, WIREs Climate Change, 1, 10-15.
NEA (National Energy Administration of the People’s Republic of China) and IEA (International Energy Agency), 2009: “Joint Statement by the National Energy Administration of the People’s Republic of China and the International Energy Agency”, Paris, 1-5.
NRDC (National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China), 2007: China’s National Climate Change Programme, 1-62.
Peters, G.P. and E.G. Hertwich, 2008: “CO2 Embodied in International Trade with Implications for Global Climate Policy”, Environmental Science & Technology, 42(5), 1401-1407.
Pelosi (Offices of Speaker Pelosi), Leader Hoyer, the Energy and Commerce Committee, and the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, 2009: “Building the Clean Energy Economy”,
Pew Center (on Global Climate Change), 2007: “Climate Change Mitigation Measures in the People’s Republic of China”, 1-4.
Pew Center (on Global Climate Change), 2010: “Carbon Market Design & Oversight: A Short Overview”, 1-15.
Taplin, R. and J. McGee, 2010: “The Asia-Pacific Partnership: implementation challenges and interplay with Kyoto”, WIREs Climate Change, 1, 16-22.
UN FCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), 2008: Report of the individual review of the greenhouse gas inventory of the United States of America submitted in 2007, 1-37.
United States, House of Representatives, 109th Congress, H.R. 6: Energy Policy Act of 2005 (introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives; 5 August 2005), 109th Congress,
van Loon, J., 17 March 2010: “Renewable Energy Investment May Reach $200 Billion in 2010”, Business Week, Bloomberg L.P.,
Wang, T. and J. Watson, 2007: “Who Owns China’s Carbon Emissions?”, Tyndall Briefing Note No. 23, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, 1-7.
Wang, T. and J. Watson, 2008: “Carbon Emissions Scenarios for China to 2100”, Tyndall Working Paper No. 121, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, 1-23.
Thursday, May 6, 2010
Off-Shore Oil and Wind
Hello Reader,
This week I turned in my last piece of non-dissertation coursework, so I thought that it might be a good time for some guilt-free blog writing time. In order to keep up with some news-worthy issues, I thought I would point to two articles from last week. The first article discusses recent a step forward in the approval process for the Cape Cod off-shore wind farm and some of the public backlash that has accompanied the news. The second article announced that Florida Governor Crist has removed his support from off-shore oil drilling projects after witnessing the devastation caused by the recent BP off-shore oil volcano. The juxtaposition of these two articles makes me wonder which is the better off-shore option: oil drilling or wind farms.
Given the recent awareness raising that the BP spill in the Gulf of Mexico has been able to offer as an argument against off-shore drilling, it seems hard to believe that there will be much public support remaining by the time this catastrophe plays out. At the very least, it seems likely that new and current drilling projects will be under much closer scrutiny regarding their safety procedures and "fail-safe" devises. After this disaster it seems reasonable to say that if off-shore drilling projects are going to continue, additional safety measures will have to be part of the minimum price of doing business.
The next question in this discussion has to be what are the concerns surrounding off-shore wind farms. It seems that the primary concern for any wind turbine project, which is echoed in the first article, is the aesthetic interference with the natural landscape. In the article, one of the more ethically credible of those arguments is that of the "coastal Wampanoag tribe, which requires unobstructed views of the sunrise for sacred ceremonies". (As a note, I consider this more ethically credible than financially-based arguments such as the detriment to tourism.) It seems reasonable that wind farm projects should try to avoid impinging upon religious ceremonies. However, I would like to question where the ethical balance lies. The main group of protesters seem to be pointing to non-religious arguments. In my mind, this raises the question: Is it ethical to refuse environmentally non-threatening energy from wind turbines, but live a lifestyle that demands the consumption of fossil fuels?
This is an especially interesting question when you consider that the protesters must (or at least should) have some idea of the damage that is caused by the extraction, transportation, and use of those fuels. Whether it is the damage associated with the essentially inevitable oil spills, the death of coal miners, the removal of mountain tops, or the indirect damage caused by emissions, leading a fossil fuel based lifestyle results in tangible damages to the environment and human lives. Admittedly, it is unlikely that all of these damages can be avoided in every case. Furthermore, I understand that even believing and understanding the damages caused by such a lifestyle does not mean that individuals can change their lifestyles alone. However, in a case such as the Cape Wind project where an obvious solution has been presented, is it ethical to protest and obstruct the process beyond ensuring that due diligence has been pursued?
Along the same lines, I have to question if forced to make the choice, whether Cape Wind protesters would choose to have an oil rig 40 miles off their coast or a wind farm a few miles off their coast. While it is unlikely that the protesters will ever have to make that decision, it raises another interesting ethical notion. That is, by refusing the wind farm, protesters are making a commitment to use other energy sources (assuming that they are not planning on going off the grid), which invariably means that the environment will need to be damaged off some other coast or mountain range. That does not seem fair when they have a different option.
Thus, when it comes down to a choice between the tangible damages caused by off-shore oil and the artificial damages caused by off-shore wind, I assert that off-shore wind is the ethically superior choice. Thank you for your time.
Sean Diamond
This week I turned in my last piece of non-dissertation coursework, so I thought that it might be a good time for some guilt-free blog writing time. In order to keep up with some news-worthy issues, I thought I would point to two articles from last week. The first article discusses recent a step forward in the approval process for the Cape Cod off-shore wind farm and some of the public backlash that has accompanied the news. The second article announced that Florida Governor Crist has removed his support from off-shore oil drilling projects after witnessing the devastation caused by the recent BP off-shore oil volcano. The juxtaposition of these two articles makes me wonder which is the better off-shore option: oil drilling or wind farms.
Given the recent awareness raising that the BP spill in the Gulf of Mexico has been able to offer as an argument against off-shore drilling, it seems hard to believe that there will be much public support remaining by the time this catastrophe plays out. At the very least, it seems likely that new and current drilling projects will be under much closer scrutiny regarding their safety procedures and "fail-safe" devises. After this disaster it seems reasonable to say that if off-shore drilling projects are going to continue, additional safety measures will have to be part of the minimum price of doing business.
The next question in this discussion has to be what are the concerns surrounding off-shore wind farms. It seems that the primary concern for any wind turbine project, which is echoed in the first article, is the aesthetic interference with the natural landscape. In the article, one of the more ethically credible of those arguments is that of the "coastal Wampanoag tribe, which requires unobstructed views of the sunrise for sacred ceremonies". (As a note, I consider this more ethically credible than financially-based arguments such as the detriment to tourism.) It seems reasonable that wind farm projects should try to avoid impinging upon religious ceremonies. However, I would like to question where the ethical balance lies. The main group of protesters seem to be pointing to non-religious arguments. In my mind, this raises the question: Is it ethical to refuse environmentally non-threatening energy from wind turbines, but live a lifestyle that demands the consumption of fossil fuels?
This is an especially interesting question when you consider that the protesters must (or at least should) have some idea of the damage that is caused by the extraction, transportation, and use of those fuels. Whether it is the damage associated with the essentially inevitable oil spills, the death of coal miners, the removal of mountain tops, or the indirect damage caused by emissions, leading a fossil fuel based lifestyle results in tangible damages to the environment and human lives. Admittedly, it is unlikely that all of these damages can be avoided in every case. Furthermore, I understand that even believing and understanding the damages caused by such a lifestyle does not mean that individuals can change their lifestyles alone. However, in a case such as the Cape Wind project where an obvious solution has been presented, is it ethical to protest and obstruct the process beyond ensuring that due diligence has been pursued?
Along the same lines, I have to question if forced to make the choice, whether Cape Wind protesters would choose to have an oil rig 40 miles off their coast or a wind farm a few miles off their coast. While it is unlikely that the protesters will ever have to make that decision, it raises another interesting ethical notion. That is, by refusing the wind farm, protesters are making a commitment to use other energy sources (assuming that they are not planning on going off the grid), which invariably means that the environment will need to be damaged off some other coast or mountain range. That does not seem fair when they have a different option.
Thus, when it comes down to a choice between the tangible damages caused by off-shore oil and the artificial damages caused by off-shore wind, I assert that off-shore wind is the ethically superior choice. Thank you for your time.
Sean Diamond
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