Hello Readers,
This week I am leaving Norwich (where I have lived for the past year) to return to America. As such, I thought it would be good idea to reflect on some of the things from the past year that I've really enjoyed.
Thing 1: Korfball
In the out'n'out fun category, Korfball immediately leaps to mind. If you haven't heard of Korf before, you are not alone. I would suspect 99.999% of the world population hasn't heard of it either. Before I arrived at UEA this year, I hadn't heard of it either. By random happenstance, I decided to join the UEA Korfball Club, and it was an excellent decision.
The sport itself is a bizarre twist on basketball. Legend has it that at the turn of the 20th century a Dutch gym teacher learned about basketball, but decided that he need the sport to be playable by his male and female students at the same time. The end result: Korfball, which has a hoop on a pole in the middle of each half of the court and requires 4 girls and 4 boys on each team. To loosely tie this into the sustainability theme of this blog... it is a great low-carbon (i.e. very little equipment needed), community-building experience. By forcing co-ed teams (and making it so that boys can only guard boys and girls can only guard girls) the sport tends to be very sociable and promotes a non-threatening environment for physical activity.
Thing 2: The Greenhouse
Another random happenstance led to me volunteering at the Greenhouse Cafe this year. It turned out to be another great experience. The staff and other volunteers became very good friends of mine. I was introduced to vegetarian cooking/baking, which I will be sure to continue when I return to the US. In fact, when I get the chance, I may post some of the my own recipes on this website.
In addition to the lessons in the cafe kitchen, the Greenhouse Trust introduced me to an excellent 'business model' for a sustainable, community-based non-profit organization. Their facilities (and good food) provided a place for green-minded people in Norwich to congregate, and the volunteers in the cafe and shop helped to support the sustainable living campaigns put on by the trust.
Thing 3: The City and Countryside
The physical layout of Norwich and the surrounding suburbs and countryside helped to make this year great. By having a compact, walkable city center with loads of restaurants, pubs, music venues, dance clubs, etc., there always seemed to be plenty to do. Also, when I felt like getting away from hectic-ness or just getting some exercise, the miles and miles of running/bike paths through parks and fields were the perfect answer.
Thing 4: My Course and Coursemates
Last but not least, my climate change course and all of my coursemates definitely made my year-long experience in Norwich worthwhile. I learned enough about climate change science to confidently hold an intellectual conversation (or debate) about the topic. Somewhat surprisingly, my most memorable and influential module in my degree was certainly Sustainable Consumption (the instigation for this blog). The subject matter and the interactive nature of the seminars were well designed.
To any of my coursemates that happen to be reading this... well, it was a great year! Let me know if you find yourself in America!
Cheers,
Sean Diamond
Monday, August 30, 2010
Thursday, August 26, 2010
Renewable vs. Nuclear or Renewable plus Nuclear
Hello Readers,
For years now, I've been reading articles, blog posts, and op-ed pieces debating the merits of nuclear and renewable technologies and the use of them in the development of a low-carbon energy grid. Without feeling a need to reference any specific examples, both sides of the debate (which are both arguably environmentalist in nature) seem to universally agree that fossil-fuel power plants are 'evil'; however, neither side can agree on the best alternative.
Both sides of the argument tend to be concerned about the environment in some capacity and agree that reducing carbon emissions and other pollutants is a good idea. Renewable energy proponents (nuclear opponents) tend to disapprove of the radioactive waste and international security issues associated with nuclear. Whereas, nuclear proponents (renewable energy opponents) tend to site the disruption of the landscape/habitats caused by covering vast areas of land (or waterways) with solar or wind (or hydro) technologies. Meanwhile, fossil-fuel proponents (the champions of the status quo) will point to the weaknesses in either argument and completely deny climate change issues to ensure that their investments (either capital or lifestyle investments) are safe.
As a physicist in undergrad (with a basic understanding of radiation and nuclear technologies) and a climate change scientist in postgrad, I have never fully settled on either side of the renewable vs. nuclear debate. I have come to acknowledge nuclear power plants -if run responsibly- can be a relatively clean source of power. However, careful geopolitical considerations should be accounted for in the development of any new nuclear power plant (i.e. While I understand the reasoning behind sanctioning Iran, it is hypocritical of the USA to discourage other countries from developing nuclear facilities while simultaneously attempting to reinvigorate its domestic nuclear industry.). On the other hand, massive deployments of renewable generators (on the scale necessary to power even half of the current US demand) will require the disruption of not-insignificant portions of natural landscapes and will require huge infrastructural projects on the electric grids (i.e. the incorporation of energy storage and/or reinforced transmission lines).
Of course, either case -if implemented and managed responsibly- will only have a marginal environmental impact compared to the current reliance on fossil-fuels. So it begs the question: how can the renewable vs. nuclear debate turn into what it should be a fossil-fuel vs. non-fossil-fuel debate?
While reading an article about the impacts of climate change on nuclear power plants, a thought occurred to me. Why not attempt to combine the two technologies? Specifically, the article referenced the weakness of many nuclear power plants is the need to use adjacent rivers for cooling. However, this means that the heated water cannot exceed 90 degrees F, which is generally not an issue except on especially hot days (such as those experienced in the USA this past summer). Otherwise, the expelled water would start cooking the wildlife in the river.
Thus, my thought was all new nuclear plants should be coupled with concentrated solar power (CSP) plants to maximize efficiency. The CSP plant, which would need to operate at temperatures of several hundred degrees Fahrenheit, could use the expelled cooling water from the nuclear plant as a preheater. This would simultaneously allow CSP plants to produce more energy with fewer/smaller collectors and allow for more significant levels of cooling for the nuclear plant on hot days. Also, This will allow for more energy to be created for every gallon of water used (e.g. up to 800 gal/MWh for CSP), and in a worst case scenario the CSP mirrors could be turned away from the sun to allow the system to act as a massive radiator for the attached nuclear plant.
Such a solution may not fully alleviate the concerns of either side of the renewable vs. nuclear debate, but it may help to bring the how to 'solve' climate change debate back into perspective. Ultimately, as both sides of the debate continue to batter each others' weaknesses rather than search for solutions, a stalemate only supports the status quo.
Thanks for reading! Please leave your comments or objections down below.
Sean Diamond
For years now, I've been reading articles, blog posts, and op-ed pieces debating the merits of nuclear and renewable technologies and the use of them in the development of a low-carbon energy grid. Without feeling a need to reference any specific examples, both sides of the debate (which are both arguably environmentalist in nature) seem to universally agree that fossil-fuel power plants are 'evil'; however, neither side can agree on the best alternative.
Both sides of the argument tend to be concerned about the environment in some capacity and agree that reducing carbon emissions and other pollutants is a good idea. Renewable energy proponents (nuclear opponents) tend to disapprove of the radioactive waste and international security issues associated with nuclear. Whereas, nuclear proponents (renewable energy opponents) tend to site the disruption of the landscape/habitats caused by covering vast areas of land (or waterways) with solar or wind (or hydro) technologies. Meanwhile, fossil-fuel proponents (the champions of the status quo) will point to the weaknesses in either argument and completely deny climate change issues to ensure that their investments (either capital or lifestyle investments) are safe.
As a physicist in undergrad (with a basic understanding of radiation and nuclear technologies) and a climate change scientist in postgrad, I have never fully settled on either side of the renewable vs. nuclear debate. I have come to acknowledge nuclear power plants -if run responsibly- can be a relatively clean source of power. However, careful geopolitical considerations should be accounted for in the development of any new nuclear power plant (i.e. While I understand the reasoning behind sanctioning Iran, it is hypocritical of the USA to discourage other countries from developing nuclear facilities while simultaneously attempting to reinvigorate its domestic nuclear industry.). On the other hand, massive deployments of renewable generators (on the scale necessary to power even half of the current US demand) will require the disruption of not-insignificant portions of natural landscapes and will require huge infrastructural projects on the electric grids (i.e. the incorporation of energy storage and/or reinforced transmission lines).
Of course, either case -if implemented and managed responsibly- will only have a marginal environmental impact compared to the current reliance on fossil-fuels. So it begs the question: how can the renewable vs. nuclear debate turn into what it should be a fossil-fuel vs. non-fossil-fuel debate?
While reading an article about the impacts of climate change on nuclear power plants, a thought occurred to me. Why not attempt to combine the two technologies? Specifically, the article referenced the weakness of many nuclear power plants is the need to use adjacent rivers for cooling. However, this means that the heated water cannot exceed 90 degrees F, which is generally not an issue except on especially hot days (such as those experienced in the USA this past summer). Otherwise, the expelled water would start cooking the wildlife in the river.
Thus, my thought was all new nuclear plants should be coupled with concentrated solar power (CSP) plants to maximize efficiency. The CSP plant, which would need to operate at temperatures of several hundred degrees Fahrenheit, could use the expelled cooling water from the nuclear plant as a preheater. This would simultaneously allow CSP plants to produce more energy with fewer/smaller collectors and allow for more significant levels of cooling for the nuclear plant on hot days. Also, This will allow for more energy to be created for every gallon of water used (e.g. up to 800 gal/MWh for CSP), and in a worst case scenario the CSP mirrors could be turned away from the sun to allow the system to act as a massive radiator for the attached nuclear plant.
Such a solution may not fully alleviate the concerns of either side of the renewable vs. nuclear debate, but it may help to bring the how to 'solve' climate change debate back into perspective. Ultimately, as both sides of the debate continue to batter each others' weaknesses rather than search for solutions, a stalemate only supports the status quo.
Thanks for reading! Please leave your comments or objections down below.
Sean Diamond
Tuesday, August 24, 2010
The Age of Stumped
Hello Readers,
Earlier in the year I was assigned a debate topic that revolved around the 'documentary' the Age of Stupid. The premise of the movie is that a man (living a few decades from now in a remote arctic archive) is looking back on the history of the world leading up to the severe climate change during the coming decades.
In the movie, the narrator flips through a number of real news clips portraying severe weather events prior to 2010. The effect of condensing several sensational news stories together is meant to indicate that these were obvious precursors to even more severe weather to come. The narrator, who is looking at his past (our future), calls the time we are living in "The Age of Stupid". He asks, "Why didn't we save ourselves when we had the chance?"
The rest of the film offers several paradoxical stories of people in contemporary society. Each story pointing to how 'stupid' we are being. In the film, it is obvious that we are missing all of the signs of impending disaster. While this movie simplifies the complexities of resolving the issues that are causing anthropogenic climate change, it makes no question about whether there are issues (and hopefully this will be the case for public opinion sooner rather than later).
During my debate about the film, I took issue with these over-simplifications. I also did not think that smashing several real-world news clips about weather-related disasters was a proper motivator for actionable change. However, over the past month or so... when the actual daily news started to look like the movie's montage of news clips (See the "Hell and High Water" article on Climate Progress), I began to wonder if the dramatic weather events associated with the changing climate was the only tangible warning we were going to get.
Certainly, pointing to every passing storm and drought as an indicator of climate change is the wrong way to encourage social and behavioral change. Especially when - to be scientifically accurate - every legitimate representation of an extreme weather event requires the disclaimer "not directly caused by climate change", it seems impossible to use the facts as a public motivator without moving into the realm of fear mongering. How can the messaging get past this barrier?
Perhaps it will take related messages, such as the announcement last week by NASA scientists that plant growth will not necessarily continue to benefit from increased carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, to tip the scales of public opinion and motivate action. Unfortunately, articles (e.g. the related article in the Christian Science Monitor) about such findings are drenched in the term "uncertainty", which means something different to scientists and the general public. This again dulls the meaning of the findings in the minds of most readers.
Thus, I think the 'Age of Stupid' might be a bit harsh when describing the state of affairs today. Instead, I would like to offer the title the 'Age of Stumped'. Wherein those who know what is going on are unsure of how to communicate the issues in terms that others can understand without sounding alarmist.
On a side note, the term 'alarmist' makes me think of a t-shirt I once saw. The t-shirt read "I am a Bomb Technician, If you see me running, try to keep up!" So I have to ask: is there a time to simply start 'running'? I certainly don't think now is the time, but will there be if things do not change? At what point does it stop being 'alarmist' and start being practical?
I do not know the answer to these questions. Instead, I will leave you with a quote from Douglas Adams:
"Don't Panic"
Thanks, for reading along. I'd love to hear your comments on the subject.
Sean Diamond
Earlier in the year I was assigned a debate topic that revolved around the 'documentary' the Age of Stupid. The premise of the movie is that a man (living a few decades from now in a remote arctic archive) is looking back on the history of the world leading up to the severe climate change during the coming decades.
In the movie, the narrator flips through a number of real news clips portraying severe weather events prior to 2010. The effect of condensing several sensational news stories together is meant to indicate that these were obvious precursors to even more severe weather to come. The narrator, who is looking at his past (our future), calls the time we are living in "The Age of Stupid". He asks, "Why didn't we save ourselves when we had the chance?"
The rest of the film offers several paradoxical stories of people in contemporary society. Each story pointing to how 'stupid' we are being. In the film, it is obvious that we are missing all of the signs of impending disaster. While this movie simplifies the complexities of resolving the issues that are causing anthropogenic climate change, it makes no question about whether there are issues (and hopefully this will be the case for public opinion sooner rather than later).
During my debate about the film, I took issue with these over-simplifications. I also did not think that smashing several real-world news clips about weather-related disasters was a proper motivator for actionable change. However, over the past month or so... when the actual daily news started to look like the movie's montage of news clips (See the "Hell and High Water" article on Climate Progress), I began to wonder if the dramatic weather events associated with the changing climate was the only tangible warning we were going to get.
Certainly, pointing to every passing storm and drought as an indicator of climate change is the wrong way to encourage social and behavioral change. Especially when - to be scientifically accurate - every legitimate representation of an extreme weather event requires the disclaimer "not directly caused by climate change", it seems impossible to use the facts as a public motivator without moving into the realm of fear mongering. How can the messaging get past this barrier?
Perhaps it will take related messages, such as the announcement last week by NASA scientists that plant growth will not necessarily continue to benefit from increased carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, to tip the scales of public opinion and motivate action. Unfortunately, articles (e.g. the related article in the Christian Science Monitor) about such findings are drenched in the term "uncertainty", which means something different to scientists and the general public. This again dulls the meaning of the findings in the minds of most readers.
Thus, I think the 'Age of Stupid' might be a bit harsh when describing the state of affairs today. Instead, I would like to offer the title the 'Age of Stumped'. Wherein those who know what is going on are unsure of how to communicate the issues in terms that others can understand without sounding alarmist.
On a side note, the term 'alarmist' makes me think of a t-shirt I once saw. The t-shirt read "I am a Bomb Technician, If you see me running, try to keep up!" So I have to ask: is there a time to simply start 'running'? I certainly don't think now is the time, but will there be if things do not change? At what point does it stop being 'alarmist' and start being practical?
I do not know the answer to these questions. Instead, I will leave you with a quote from Douglas Adams:
"Don't Panic"
Thanks, for reading along. I'd love to hear your comments on the subject.
Sean Diamond
Friday, August 13, 2010
A New Beginning
Hello Readers,
I have now turned in my dissertation and taken a short break from typing, well, anything really. In light of this new beginning, I've taken the time to change the colors of the blog to some more earthy tones. I hope you enjoy them. Over the coming months, I am going to try to bring this website into its own by developing a more distinct (and hopefully refined) style.
I am still not entirely sure of the final format that this blog will take, but I figure letting it grow naturally will be better than trying to force it in any particular direction. To help me keep organized and to make this website more useful, I am going to expand the permanent (non-blog post) pages of the website to include a list of other useful websites on various sustainability topics. I know having a "useful links" page is not particularly novel, but I figure it couldn't hurt.
With those notes aside, I'd like to move onto an actual topical post...
Earlier this week, another New York Times headline: "But Will It Make You Happy?" caught my attention. Recently, the NYT has had a string of interesting philosophical articles, so I clicked the link and much to my surprise it was not a philosophical article at all. Well, not intentionally. The article refers to a decline in conspicuous consumption (i.e. a sociological concept wherein consumers purchase things to show off their social status) and goes on to laud the savvy retailers who are capitalizing on consumers who are spending more time at home and looking for interactions with family and friends.
In order to make a story out of these concepts, the article starts to highlight the story of Tammy Strobel - a convert to minimalism (kind of the arch-nemesis of materialism and conspicuous consumption) and simple living. Digging a little deeper on Ms. Strobel's blog (RowdyKittens.com) I discovered that she is actively following the fundamental concepts of simple living by choosing to avoid the "work-spend treadmill" (see the Story of Stuff). I have just started to look through her blog, but it looks promising.
In particular, Ms. Strobel's post about the 100 Thing Challenge, which happened to be the first post I saw, brought an interesting idea to my attention. The concept is to limit yourself to 100 personal possessions for a certain period of time (I would guess that ideally the period of time would be indefinite). Similar to the idea in the NYT article, limiting the things you have around you would encourage more social interaction, which ultimately should lead to a happier and more sustainable life.
Of course, with some ironic thanks to airline luggage restrictions, I have been living this past year within the confines of the 100 lbs. challenge if not the 100 thing challenge. Aside, from clothing I've had few material goods to compete with my friends for my attention. Thus, my eminent return to the US - now that my coursework is complete - forces me to reflect upon the possibility of returning to "stuff" and all of the "stuffness" it has to offer.
Fortunately, I sold or donated most of my possessions (including my car) before moving to England for the year, so I do not have to go through that process again. However, will I be able to avoid the allure of gathering belongings once again? It seems that only time will tell. Of course, through random happenstance, I overheard a couple of ladies in a local cafe discussing how one of their sisters had moved with her husband from the UK to the US some time ago and how it had fast-tracked them onto the "work-spend treadmill" (obviously not in those words). The discussion read like a chapter out of a "the symptoms of consumerism" medical guide. The sister and husband were now making more money than they had before but barely had any time to relax. Thus, they went on vacation (returning to England) and were able to relax (or more specifically to not do anything but sit around) with their family for a couple weeks before returning to their fast-paced lifestyle.
Naturally, this discussion was only on side of the story, and it was possible that the sister was completely happy with her material-rich lifestyle. However, the tale, which I heard just a day after reading the NYT article, encouraged me to focus on avoiding such a trap when I return home.
That's it for now. Please take a look at the links on the new page and check back soon!
Thanks,
Sean Diamond
I have now turned in my dissertation and taken a short break from typing, well, anything really. In light of this new beginning, I've taken the time to change the colors of the blog to some more earthy tones. I hope you enjoy them. Over the coming months, I am going to try to bring this website into its own by developing a more distinct (and hopefully refined) style.
I am still not entirely sure of the final format that this blog will take, but I figure letting it grow naturally will be better than trying to force it in any particular direction. To help me keep organized and to make this website more useful, I am going to expand the permanent (non-blog post) pages of the website to include a list of other useful websites on various sustainability topics. I know having a "useful links" page is not particularly novel, but I figure it couldn't hurt.
With those notes aside, I'd like to move onto an actual topical post...
Earlier this week, another New York Times headline: "But Will It Make You Happy?" caught my attention. Recently, the NYT has had a string of interesting philosophical articles, so I clicked the link and much to my surprise it was not a philosophical article at all. Well, not intentionally. The article refers to a decline in conspicuous consumption (i.e. a sociological concept wherein consumers purchase things to show off their social status) and goes on to laud the savvy retailers who are capitalizing on consumers who are spending more time at home and looking for interactions with family and friends.
In order to make a story out of these concepts, the article starts to highlight the story of Tammy Strobel - a convert to minimalism (kind of the arch-nemesis of materialism and conspicuous consumption) and simple living. Digging a little deeper on Ms. Strobel's blog (RowdyKittens.com) I discovered that she is actively following the fundamental concepts of simple living by choosing to avoid the "work-spend treadmill" (see the Story of Stuff). I have just started to look through her blog, but it looks promising.
In particular, Ms. Strobel's post about the 100 Thing Challenge, which happened to be the first post I saw, brought an interesting idea to my attention. The concept is to limit yourself to 100 personal possessions for a certain period of time (I would guess that ideally the period of time would be indefinite). Similar to the idea in the NYT article, limiting the things you have around you would encourage more social interaction, which ultimately should lead to a happier and more sustainable life.
Of course, with some ironic thanks to airline luggage restrictions, I have been living this past year within the confines of the 100 lbs. challenge if not the 100 thing challenge. Aside, from clothing I've had few material goods to compete with my friends for my attention. Thus, my eminent return to the US - now that my coursework is complete - forces me to reflect upon the possibility of returning to "stuff" and all of the "stuffness" it has to offer.
Fortunately, I sold or donated most of my possessions (including my car) before moving to England for the year, so I do not have to go through that process again. However, will I be able to avoid the allure of gathering belongings once again? It seems that only time will tell. Of course, through random happenstance, I overheard a couple of ladies in a local cafe discussing how one of their sisters had moved with her husband from the UK to the US some time ago and how it had fast-tracked them onto the "work-spend treadmill" (obviously not in those words). The discussion read like a chapter out of a "the symptoms of consumerism" medical guide. The sister and husband were now making more money than they had before but barely had any time to relax. Thus, they went on vacation (returning to England) and were able to relax (or more specifically to not do anything but sit around) with their family for a couple weeks before returning to their fast-paced lifestyle.
Naturally, this discussion was only on side of the story, and it was possible that the sister was completely happy with her material-rich lifestyle. However, the tale, which I heard just a day after reading the NYT article, encouraged me to focus on avoiding such a trap when I return home.
That's it for now. Please take a look at the links on the new page and check back soon!
Thanks,
Sean Diamond
Saturday, July 31, 2010
In Debt to Society
Hello Readers,
This post is more of a musing and a question-raising post than an actionable statement. My questions, which have been weighing on my mind lately, are as follows: "Is it sustainable for a society to burden students with debt?" and "Is it fair for a society to burden students with debt?"
In the US it is not uncommon for many students to take out substantial amounts of student loans (i.e. loans that can take a decade or more to pay off even with a decent job) to fund their education beyond high school. Many Europeans that I have talked to about this practice find it appalling since their systems of higher education tend to be covered largely if not solely through taxes and government subsidies. However, which system is more sustainable and more fair?
Initially, some would argue that education is a basic human right and ultimately a well-educated population results in a more prosperous society. Thus, it makes sense for governments to give anyone who is willing and able as much incentive as possible to obtain a thorough education.
In opposition to that point of view, it could be argued that without an incentive to finish one's education many people would simply "free ride" or take advantage of a free education as an excuse to avoid work. (Although from personal experience I find this argument difficult to believe.)
Further, it could also be argued that by forcing students to take out loans to cover their education, the system forces students into a social contract - an obligation to use the skills and knowledge obtained from their education for the betterment of society. Or in lieu of taking out loans this obligation could be met by the individual joining an armed services program or simply avoided by having one's parents pay for the education ahead of time. In this way, it could be argued that expensive educations are sustainable in that they bind the student to the society in which they are educated by obligating them to work at least until the loan is repaid.
However, I would argue that this is not the case. In fact, rather than creating a social contract that compels the student to use their skills and knowledge to work toward the betterment of society, the current US higher education system encourages the student to use their education to which ever means earns them the most money personally... if for no other purpose than to get by and pay off the loan! Furthermore, I would also contend that for those graduates who are interested in working for the betterment of society rather than for profit are essentially making a double payment on their social contract.
Consider that a college graduate who is working for a non-profit organization or as a public servant puts all of their efforts into improving society and must also pay off their student loans on a typically meager salary. Whereas, a college graduate who is working in a for-profit organization is working (by definition) to improve the lot of an individual or group other than society at-large but is likely making more than their non-profit counterpart. Now, some would argue that through capitalism the for-profit worker by contributing more directly to GDP is benefiting society at least as much as (and possibly more than) the non-profit worker. I do not believe it is that easy to judge. Thus, it curious that the 'market signals' for which type of career to pursue point in only one direction.
With these initial arguments laid out, I would be curious to hear what others have to say about the matter. I am ultimately undecided. What do you think? Also, if students don't pay for their own education who should? Does the benefit that society gains from a better educated citizenry mean that society should pay for the education? What type of system will better foster a more sustainable society?
Thanks,
Sean Diamond
This post is more of a musing and a question-raising post than an actionable statement. My questions, which have been weighing on my mind lately, are as follows: "Is it sustainable for a society to burden students with debt?" and "Is it fair for a society to burden students with debt?"
In the US it is not uncommon for many students to take out substantial amounts of student loans (i.e. loans that can take a decade or more to pay off even with a decent job) to fund their education beyond high school. Many Europeans that I have talked to about this practice find it appalling since their systems of higher education tend to be covered largely if not solely through taxes and government subsidies. However, which system is more sustainable and more fair?
Initially, some would argue that education is a basic human right and ultimately a well-educated population results in a more prosperous society. Thus, it makes sense for governments to give anyone who is willing and able as much incentive as possible to obtain a thorough education.
In opposition to that point of view, it could be argued that without an incentive to finish one's education many people would simply "free ride" or take advantage of a free education as an excuse to avoid work. (Although from personal experience I find this argument difficult to believe.)
Further, it could also be argued that by forcing students to take out loans to cover their education, the system forces students into a social contract - an obligation to use the skills and knowledge obtained from their education for the betterment of society. Or in lieu of taking out loans this obligation could be met by the individual joining an armed services program or simply avoided by having one's parents pay for the education ahead of time. In this way, it could be argued that expensive educations are sustainable in that they bind the student to the society in which they are educated by obligating them to work at least until the loan is repaid.
However, I would argue that this is not the case. In fact, rather than creating a social contract that compels the student to use their skills and knowledge to work toward the betterment of society, the current US higher education system encourages the student to use their education to which ever means earns them the most money personally... if for no other purpose than to get by and pay off the loan! Furthermore, I would also contend that for those graduates who are interested in working for the betterment of society rather than for profit are essentially making a double payment on their social contract.
Consider that a college graduate who is working for a non-profit organization or as a public servant puts all of their efforts into improving society and must also pay off their student loans on a typically meager salary. Whereas, a college graduate who is working in a for-profit organization is working (by definition) to improve the lot of an individual or group other than society at-large but is likely making more than their non-profit counterpart. Now, some would argue that through capitalism the for-profit worker by contributing more directly to GDP is benefiting society at least as much as (and possibly more than) the non-profit worker. I do not believe it is that easy to judge. Thus, it curious that the 'market signals' for which type of career to pursue point in only one direction.
With these initial arguments laid out, I would be curious to hear what others have to say about the matter. I am ultimately undecided. What do you think? Also, if students don't pay for their own education who should? Does the benefit that society gains from a better educated citizenry mean that society should pay for the education? What type of system will better foster a more sustainable society?
Thanks,
Sean Diamond
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
A Timely Article...
Hello Dear Readers,
One week before my dissertation is due, I have found a timely article that briefly describes my dissertation topic: energy storage on the electric grid. If you have tried to read through my dissertation proposal or listened to me try to summarize my dissertation in person and had trouble understanding, I encourage you to read the brief article from the New York Times. Then, just understand that I am studying the impact of those technologies on the overall greenhouse gas emissions of the grid.
That's all for now. Wish me luck as I finish my dissertation!
Sincerely,
Sean Diamond
This post references the article:
Wind Drives Growing Use of Batteries
By MATTHEW L. WALD
Published on July 27, 2010
In the New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/28/business/energy-environment/28storage.html
One week before my dissertation is due, I have found a timely article that briefly describes my dissertation topic: energy storage on the electric grid. If you have tried to read through my dissertation proposal or listened to me try to summarize my dissertation in person and had trouble understanding, I encourage you to read the brief article from the New York Times. Then, just understand that I am studying the impact of those technologies on the overall greenhouse gas emissions of the grid.
That's all for now. Wish me luck as I finish my dissertation!
Sincerely,
Sean Diamond
This post references the article:
Wind Drives Growing Use of Batteries
By MATTHEW L. WALD
Published on July 27, 2010
In the New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/28/business/energy-environment/28storage.html
Saturday, July 24, 2010
Rob Hopkins TED Talk
Hello Readers,
After my last post, I stumbled upon this video. For those of you unfamiliar with the idea of the Transition Movement, this should fill you in!
Thanks,
Sean Diamond
Friday, July 23, 2010
The End is Nigh!
Hello Readers,
Admittedly, the title of this post is a bit dramatic. What I mean to say is that I am (knocking on wood) nearly finished with my master's degree. It is less than two weeks until my dissertation is due, and I am working furiously to finish it despite some minor setbacks.
Despite the coming transition, I have every intention of continuing this blog as a way to stay mentally connected to the sustainability-related causes that I have been pursuing for the past year. In fact, I hope to post information and ideas more frequently once my dissertation is complete, so please check back regularly or add me not your RSS feed or whatever it is that blog-readers do.
Finally, for the past year I have been developing the idea of founding a community-based non-profit that promotes sustainable lifestyles and choices. In particular, I was inspired by my volunteer work at the Greenhouse Trust and what I've learned about the Transition Movement. When I return to the US, I would be very interested in visiting any organizations or communities that are based on similar principles. If you are associated with such a group, please send me an email and tell me about your experience!
Thanks for following along!
Sincerely,
Sean Diamond
Admittedly, the title of this post is a bit dramatic. What I mean to say is that I am (knocking on wood) nearly finished with my master's degree. It is less than two weeks until my dissertation is due, and I am working furiously to finish it despite some minor setbacks.
Despite the coming transition, I have every intention of continuing this blog as a way to stay mentally connected to the sustainability-related causes that I have been pursuing for the past year. In fact, I hope to post information and ideas more frequently once my dissertation is complete, so please check back regularly or add me not your RSS feed or whatever it is that blog-readers do.
Finally, for the past year I have been developing the idea of founding a community-based non-profit that promotes sustainable lifestyles and choices. In particular, I was inspired by my volunteer work at the Greenhouse Trust and what I've learned about the Transition Movement. When I return to the US, I would be very interested in visiting any organizations or communities that are based on similar principles. If you are associated with such a group, please send me an email and tell me about your experience!
Thanks for following along!
Sincerely,
Sean Diamond
Monday, July 5, 2010
Afraid of being jobless?
Hello Reader,
Today, I read an article that caught my attention. For years now, I've heard the generic claim that oil companies receive absurdly large government subsidies. However, I've rarely heard "large" spelled out as a quantifiable number. Well, it turns out that "large" is apparently $4 billion per year (on average). Now, as best as I can tell from the article, that is $4 billion of real tax money that is not paid by oil industry companies to the federal government each year. This is compared to the approximately $93 billion per year (during 2006-2008) that those same companies do pay according to the American Petroleum Institute.
The argument apparently goes that without these tax incentives (aka subsidies) oil companies would move their operations to other countries. To frame this argument in another manner, without what effectively amounts to a 4% tax break (not paying $4 billion out of what would otherwise be $97 billion in taxes) all of these oil companies, which apparently provide 9.2 million jobs in the US, would move to other countries leaving Americans jobless! For some reason, I have a hard time believing that argument.
For one thing, according to NationMaster.com, which cites the CIA World Fact Book as its source, the US apparently only had 20,970,000,000 barrels of proven reserves in 2008 and was producing 8,457,000 barrels/day in 2007. Doing the math (and initially assuming constant production) this works effectively out to roughly 7 years of remaining oil production capability.
Of course, oil production is not nearly that straight forward (the closer a country gets to the end of its proven reserves the slower its production), and US oil production will likely last much longer than 7 years but at an ever-declining rate. It is also prudent to consider that proven reserve numbers are flexible in that new technologies or new wells can cause that number to increase. However, to make the long story short, the United States' ability to hold sway as a major oil producing nation is limited.
Considering that some of the subsidies now offered to oil companies in the US were implemented as early as 1913 in order to help those companies develop, it seems fitting that those same companies should start to pay back some of that start-up money before they are forced to relocate due to a shortage in supply. More importantly, it makes more sense for that money to be used to find a replacement for the oil industry, which is getting to the end of its useful life, by way of transferring the subsidies to other energy industries that are likely to last beyond the year 2100.
One example would be to redirect that money to wind and solar energy companies and manufacturers. Not only would this allow for a great domestic expansion of our current renewable energy portfolio in the US, but it might also re-engage entrepreneurs and manufacturing companies as well. This could also make for an interesting shift in dynamics considering that the majority of the world's demand for wind turbine and solar panels is currently outside of the US (with China leading the charge).
Just imagine if the United States government could muster the political will to remove the $4 billion per year oil company subsidies and divert that money to kick-start manufacturing and energy companies that would not only stay in the US (as opposed to threatening to leave) but could possibly help to reduce our trade deficit with countries like China and improve our own national utility grid! All of this in what amounts to a zero sum game for Washington politicians, the IRS, and the national debt.
Additionally, as more renewable energy generators are produced and installed, this will require some additional infrastructural support of the electricity grid (read as more jobs and investment opportunities). In turn (and perhaps in some cases simultaneously) an improved utility grid will necessarily create opportunities for reducing emissions and moving from petroleum-powered to electrically-powered vehicles.
This means that there is a way to reduce our subsidies to oil companies operating domestically, reduce our dependence on all oil companies (and countries), improve our electricity grid and our transportation system, and secure domestic jobs for decades to come. When I lay it out like that, I have to ask: Why has this not happened yet?
Is the math too obscure? Is the information that well hidden? Are lobbyist for oil companies that influential? Is the political climate in Washington that sticky? Or do Americans just want to keep giving oil companies tax breaks for fear that many more jobs will evaporate overnight?
Please, somebody set me straight!
Thanks,
Sean Diamond
This post references:
As Oil Industry Fights a Tax, It Reaps Subsidies
By DAVID KOCIENIEWSKI
Published: July 3, 2010
In the New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/04/business/04bptax.html
Today, I read an article that caught my attention. For years now, I've heard the generic claim that oil companies receive absurdly large government subsidies. However, I've rarely heard "large" spelled out as a quantifiable number. Well, it turns out that "large" is apparently $4 billion per year (on average). Now, as best as I can tell from the article, that is $4 billion of real tax money that is not paid by oil industry companies to the federal government each year. This is compared to the approximately $93 billion per year (during 2006-2008) that those same companies do pay according to the American Petroleum Institute.
The argument apparently goes that without these tax incentives (aka subsidies) oil companies would move their operations to other countries. To frame this argument in another manner, without what effectively amounts to a 4% tax break (not paying $4 billion out of what would otherwise be $97 billion in taxes) all of these oil companies, which apparently provide 9.2 million jobs in the US, would move to other countries leaving Americans jobless! For some reason, I have a hard time believing that argument.
For one thing, according to NationMaster.com, which cites the CIA World Fact Book as its source, the US apparently only had 20,970,000,000 barrels of proven reserves in 2008 and was producing 8,457,000 barrels/day in 2007. Doing the math (and initially assuming constant production) this works effectively out to roughly 7 years of remaining oil production capability.
Of course, oil production is not nearly that straight forward (the closer a country gets to the end of its proven reserves the slower its production), and US oil production will likely last much longer than 7 years but at an ever-declining rate. It is also prudent to consider that proven reserve numbers are flexible in that new technologies or new wells can cause that number to increase. However, to make the long story short, the United States' ability to hold sway as a major oil producing nation is limited.
Considering that some of the subsidies now offered to oil companies in the US were implemented as early as 1913 in order to help those companies develop, it seems fitting that those same companies should start to pay back some of that start-up money before they are forced to relocate due to a shortage in supply. More importantly, it makes more sense for that money to be used to find a replacement for the oil industry, which is getting to the end of its useful life, by way of transferring the subsidies to other energy industries that are likely to last beyond the year 2100.
One example would be to redirect that money to wind and solar energy companies and manufacturers. Not only would this allow for a great domestic expansion of our current renewable energy portfolio in the US, but it might also re-engage entrepreneurs and manufacturing companies as well. This could also make for an interesting shift in dynamics considering that the majority of the world's demand for wind turbine and solar panels is currently outside of the US (with China leading the charge).
Just imagine if the United States government could muster the political will to remove the $4 billion per year oil company subsidies and divert that money to kick-start manufacturing and energy companies that would not only stay in the US (as opposed to threatening to leave) but could possibly help to reduce our trade deficit with countries like China and improve our own national utility grid! All of this in what amounts to a zero sum game for Washington politicians, the IRS, and the national debt.
Additionally, as more renewable energy generators are produced and installed, this will require some additional infrastructural support of the electricity grid (read as more jobs and investment opportunities). In turn (and perhaps in some cases simultaneously) an improved utility grid will necessarily create opportunities for reducing emissions and moving from petroleum-powered to electrically-powered vehicles.
This means that there is a way to reduce our subsidies to oil companies operating domestically, reduce our dependence on all oil companies (and countries), improve our electricity grid and our transportation system, and secure domestic jobs for decades to come. When I lay it out like that, I have to ask: Why has this not happened yet?
Is the math too obscure? Is the information that well hidden? Are lobbyist for oil companies that influential? Is the political climate in Washington that sticky? Or do Americans just want to keep giving oil companies tax breaks for fear that many more jobs will evaporate overnight?
Please, somebody set me straight!
Thanks,
Sean Diamond
This post references:
As Oil Industry Fights a Tax, It Reaps Subsidies
By DAVID KOCIENIEWSKI
Published: July 3, 2010
In the New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/04/business/04bptax.html
Wednesday, June 9, 2010
Climate Change Polls
Hello Reader,
If you are looking for information about my dissertation survey, please see the links on the left side of the page.
Otherwise, I wanted to share this op-ed piece by a professor from Stanford. The piece essentially points out that the results of many of the climate change related polls in the US are in fact misleading. It also describes the results of the professor's study that indicate that not only do the vast majority of Americans believe that anthropogenic climate change (a.k.a. 'global warming') is occurring, but that the majority of Americans also believe that the government should do something about it!
I was surprised by the conclusions in the article, so I definitely recommend it for anyone interested in public opinion on climate change.
Enjoy,
Sean Diamond
This post refers to:
The Climate Majority
By JON A. KROSNICK
Published: June 8, 2010
In the New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/09/opinion/09krosnick.html
If you are looking for information about my dissertation survey, please see the links on the left side of the page.
Otherwise, I wanted to share this op-ed piece by a professor from Stanford. The piece essentially points out that the results of many of the climate change related polls in the US are in fact misleading. It also describes the results of the professor's study that indicate that not only do the vast majority of Americans believe that anthropogenic climate change (a.k.a. 'global warming') is occurring, but that the majority of Americans also believe that the government should do something about it!
I was surprised by the conclusions in the article, so I definitely recommend it for anyone interested in public opinion on climate change.
Enjoy,
Sean Diamond
This post refers to:
The Climate Majority
By JON A. KROSNICK
Published: June 8, 2010
In the New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/09/opinion/09krosnick.html
Sunday, June 6, 2010
Doom or Transition
Hello Reader,
If you are looking for dissertation links, please see the top-left corner of the page.
Today, I stumbled across a news article about peak oil. The bulk of the article focuses on how people are expecting the worst, but the last bit actually discusses a tiny bit about the Transition movement. I do not have too much to say about this article. It is what it is. I just hope that enough people look into the Transition US movement so they are able to distinguish between the survivalist mentality and the transition mentality.
Thanks,
Sean Diamond
This post refers to:
Imagining Life Without Oil, and Being Ready
By JOHN LELAND
Published: June 5, 2010
From the New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/us/06peak.html
If you are looking for dissertation links, please see the top-left corner of the page.
Today, I stumbled across a news article about peak oil. The bulk of the article focuses on how people are expecting the worst, but the last bit actually discusses a tiny bit about the Transition movement. I do not have too much to say about this article. It is what it is. I just hope that enough people look into the Transition US movement so they are able to distinguish between the survivalist mentality and the transition mentality.
Thanks,
Sean Diamond
This post refers to:
Imagining Life Without Oil, and Being Ready
By JOHN LELAND
Published: June 5, 2010
From the New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/us/06peak.html
Monday, May 31, 2010
In Tech We Trust
Hello Readers,
If you are coming to the website to find information about my dissertation survey, please see the post that will point you to all the pages you need. Otherwise, please read on about this post's discussion topic "In Tech We Trust" (no need to click anywhere, just scroll).
This week's post was prompted by a recent New York Times article by Elisabeth Rosenthal. The article highlighted America's technological optimism, the belief that given time and effort a technological fix can solve just about any problem we might get ourselves into. Ms. Rosenthal focuses on the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, and she indicates that this event is a potential turning point away from America's blind optimism in technology.
She also points to Carbon Capture and Storage technologies (often referred to as CCS), which are being heralded by the coal industry as its future source environmental sustainability, as well as past technological fixes such as the "green revolution" in agriculture and vaccines for childhood diseases. However, she ends on the recent situation where an Icelandic volcano brought air travel over Europe to a literal standstill for several weeks. Overall, the message that Americans (and much of the rest of the world) continue to be absurdly confident in the ability of technological innovation to overcome the forces of nature that make our lives difficult (e.g. volcanoes, viruses, drought) is pretty clear.
However, I would like to ask about technology's ability to overcome our own habits and social expectations. The BP oil spill is an easy example to pick on, so I will use that. At this point, it is very easy to point to BP executives and managers and tell them they should have been more vigilant, more prudent, and more safety-conscious. And to make it clear: yes, they should have been!
Recently, the media has been pointing to BP's poor accident record and safety violations. However, I would be curious to see if any of the other oil companies have been doing any better or if BP is really a rogue oil company that was taking chances where no one else would. For some reason I am skeptical of the latter case.
In fact, I am particularly skeptical, because I have a hard time believing that BP is particularly exceptional in its expectation (or PR statements) that there was no way that anything would go so wrong that it could not be fixed. On the contrary, I think BP is the rule rather than the exception.
Take a moment to think about it. (I'll probably get some sampling bias on a blog like this, but...) Please take some time to answer these questions for yourself.
Do you believe/expect that man-made climate change is occurring (or will occur in your lifetime)?
Have you drastically changed your personal habits to prevent it from getting worse?
Have you taken action to ensure your community/state/country is doing all it can to prevent climate change from getting worse?
Do you expect that by the time things get really bad energy technology and other industries will have caught up with us and solved the problem?
If you are being honest with yourself (and you are American and you've read this far through my blog), your answers were probably "Yes", "Well, sort of", "I voted for that liberal candidate, does that count?", and "Yes". I realize that I'm generalizing, so I am likely not 100% accurate, but the point I'm trying to make is that we need to question our faith in the certainty of technological fixes. It seems as though technology has been keeping pace for so long, we as a society have stopped questioning it.
Although, it has not happened in recent historical memory, it is possible that unchecked social forces (read as expectations) can outpace technology and lead to societal downfall. Of course, in the age of globalization it is important to remember that there are several other unpleasant steps between where we are now and complete failure, so it is important not to see this as an all or nothing game.
On the other hand, I am not in favor of technological pessimism either. I do not think that the advancement of technology will necessarily result in a doomsday scenario. Instead, I would like to advocate a middle ground. In this middle ground, rather than relying on technology as a future fix for the problems we are creating today, we shape our society in a responsible manner that only relies upon what we already know we have.
We need to use an ex ante approach to technological solutions (i.e. mitigation using current and developing technologies) as much as possible rather than an ex post approach (i.e. expecting technology will allow us to adapt later). While simultaneously moderating our social habits and expectations until technology catches up with us in a manner that minimizes environmental damage. Otherwise, we will continue to build an environmental debt in addition to the current economic deficit we are running.
At this point, I would like to note that I am not suggesting which means of 'enforcement' is the most appropriate. I am an ardent believer in taking responsibility for your own actions. However, I recognize that in actuality that is not sufficient to ensure social progress, so I will leave this last point as an open-ended question: what will be necessary to move society from a blind to a cautious optimism in technology?
Thank you for your time!
Sean Diamond
If you are coming to the website to find information about my dissertation survey, please see the post that will point you to all the pages you need. Otherwise, please read on about this post's discussion topic "In Tech We Trust" (no need to click anywhere, just scroll).
This week's post was prompted by a recent New York Times article by Elisabeth Rosenthal. The article highlighted America's technological optimism, the belief that given time and effort a technological fix can solve just about any problem we might get ourselves into. Ms. Rosenthal focuses on the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, and she indicates that this event is a potential turning point away from America's blind optimism in technology.
She also points to Carbon Capture and Storage technologies (often referred to as CCS), which are being heralded by the coal industry as its future source environmental sustainability, as well as past technological fixes such as the "green revolution" in agriculture and vaccines for childhood diseases. However, she ends on the recent situation where an Icelandic volcano brought air travel over Europe to a literal standstill for several weeks. Overall, the message that Americans (and much of the rest of the world) continue to be absurdly confident in the ability of technological innovation to overcome the forces of nature that make our lives difficult (e.g. volcanoes, viruses, drought) is pretty clear.
However, I would like to ask about technology's ability to overcome our own habits and social expectations. The BP oil spill is an easy example to pick on, so I will use that. At this point, it is very easy to point to BP executives and managers and tell them they should have been more vigilant, more prudent, and more safety-conscious. And to make it clear: yes, they should have been!
Recently, the media has been pointing to BP's poor accident record and safety violations. However, I would be curious to see if any of the other oil companies have been doing any better or if BP is really a rogue oil company that was taking chances where no one else would. For some reason I am skeptical of the latter case.
In fact, I am particularly skeptical, because I have a hard time believing that BP is particularly exceptional in its expectation (or PR statements) that there was no way that anything would go so wrong that it could not be fixed. On the contrary, I think BP is the rule rather than the exception.
Take a moment to think about it. (I'll probably get some sampling bias on a blog like this, but...) Please take some time to answer these questions for yourself.
Do you believe/expect that man-made climate change is occurring (or will occur in your lifetime)?
Have you drastically changed your personal habits to prevent it from getting worse?
Have you taken action to ensure your community/state/country is doing all it can to prevent climate change from getting worse?
Do you expect that by the time things get really bad energy technology and other industries will have caught up with us and solved the problem?
If you are being honest with yourself (and you are American and you've read this far through my blog), your answers were probably "Yes", "Well, sort of", "I voted for that liberal candidate, does that count?", and "Yes". I realize that I'm generalizing, so I am likely not 100% accurate, but the point I'm trying to make is that we need to question our faith in the certainty of technological fixes. It seems as though technology has been keeping pace for so long, we as a society have stopped questioning it.
Although, it has not happened in recent historical memory, it is possible that unchecked social forces (read as expectations) can outpace technology and lead to societal downfall. Of course, in the age of globalization it is important to remember that there are several other unpleasant steps between where we are now and complete failure, so it is important not to see this as an all or nothing game.
On the other hand, I am not in favor of technological pessimism either. I do not think that the advancement of technology will necessarily result in a doomsday scenario. Instead, I would like to advocate a middle ground. In this middle ground, rather than relying on technology as a future fix for the problems we are creating today, we shape our society in a responsible manner that only relies upon what we already know we have.
We need to use an ex ante approach to technological solutions (i.e. mitigation using current and developing technologies) as much as possible rather than an ex post approach (i.e. expecting technology will allow us to adapt later). While simultaneously moderating our social habits and expectations until technology catches up with us in a manner that minimizes environmental damage. Otherwise, we will continue to build an environmental debt in addition to the current economic deficit we are running.
At this point, I would like to note that I am not suggesting which means of 'enforcement' is the most appropriate. I am an ardent believer in taking responsibility for your own actions. However, I recognize that in actuality that is not sufficient to ensure social progress, so I will leave this last point as an open-ended question: what will be necessary to move society from a blind to a cautious optimism in technology?
Thank you for your time!
Sean Diamond
Monday, May 24, 2010
Survey Release!
Hello Readers,
Today I am distributing the survey for my dissertation. I will be sending out the survey via email to contacts that I have already found. Also, I have posted information about my dissertation and the survey on this website. Here is a list of links you can use to find out about the survey:
Thank you for your time and interest!
Sincerely,
Sean Diamond
Today I am distributing the survey for my dissertation. I will be sending out the survey via email to contacts that I have already found. Also, I have posted information about my dissertation and the survey on this website. Here is a list of links you can use to find out about the survey:
- The Dissertation Proposal
This page will help you understand a little bit about why I am doing what I am doing in my dissertation. - The Introduction Letter
This page is useful for potential survey participants (people and companies that work with electric utility companies and energy storage technologies). - The Survey
This page provides a preview of the survey and offers instructions for participating in the survey.
Thank you for your time and interest!
Sincerely,
Sean Diamond
Saturday, May 15, 2010
US-China Assignment
Hello Reader,
In this post I present to you one of the essays I completed as part of my coursework. Please note that this essay was turned in on 18th March 2010, so some of the remarks in the conclusion are already a bit dated. For example, "the current political gridlock" in Washington has moved beyond the national healthcare debate; however, it has yet to actually reach a culminating point on climate change and energy! On the other hand, a new version of legislation is gaining some traction and the EPA has released its new rules for greenhouse gas emissions permits.
I hope you enjoy my academic musings...
“Compare the roles of China and the USA in the development of global climate policy”
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States and China are consistently recognized as the world’s leading emitters of greenhouse gases. Thus, they will necessarily play an integral role in the success or failure of the development of any global climate policy efforts. However, a cursory inspection of either country’s economic, political, and social structures and issues will make it evident that for either country to successfully draft (and subsequently ratify and enact) a domestic climate change policy would be no small measure. Let alone the effort required to develop a useful global climate change policy that would simultaneously satisfy both countries and the rest of the world. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that attempts to do so have been fraught with difficulty.
This essay compares the roles that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States of America (US) have played and will likely play in the development of global climate change policies.
To do so coherently, the topic has been broken into a contextual section, a contemporary section, and a conclusion section. The contextual section looks at the internal structure of each country, the role that each country has played in the Kyoto Protocol process (from its initial agreement through to its implementation in 2005), and the issue of embodied emissions in international trade, which has been largely avoided in global climate negotiations to date. The contemporary section is split into two subsections. The first addresses the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) to which both countries have been active partners since its inception in 2006. The second focuses on the events leading up to and since the Copenhagen conference. Finally, the conclusion section briefly speculates on upcoming developments surrounding the US and China with regard to global climate change policies.
II. CONTEXTUAL
1. US INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS & INFRASTRUCTURE
Up until very recently the United States has long held the title of the world’s largest GHG emitter with net annual emissions well over 6 GT of CO2e with the vast majority (>85%) of emissions coming from the energy sector (UN FCCC 2008). This is not surprising based on the breakdown of primary energy sources in the US: petroleum 37.1%, natural gas 23.8%, and coal 22.5% (EIA 2008). Thus, any climate change policy developments must be designed to contend with a US infrastructure that is largely developed and reliant upon fossil fuels.
The structure of the US federal government, notably the separation of powers amongst the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, combined with the bipartisan nature of the American political system means that the negotiation, ratification, and ultimate implementation of any (global or domestic) climate change policy will necessarily be a difficult process. In the case of a global rather than a domestic policy, an extra layer of complication is introduced in that the President (or likely members of the State Department) is responsible for negotiating the policy, while the ratification of the policy (enacting it as law) is the responsibility of Congress, before responsibility is handed back to the executive branch (likely the Environmental Protection Agency and several other departments) for enforcement. All the while, other political discussions and quarrels in Congress have the potential (proven empirically time and again) to derail or delay meaningful action with regard to climate change policy.
While the US federal government has yet to enact any statutorily binding climate change policy (international or otherwise), it does offer a number of financial incentives that promote the implementation of renewable energy and energy-efficient technologies (e.g. incentives offered in the Energy Policy Act of 2005). Also, significant progress has been made on other levels (e.g. state, corporate, and NGO).
In fact, according to the U.S. DOE (2009), “24 states plus the District of Columbia that have [legally binding Renewable Portfolio Standards] policies in place”, which require renewable energy to account for 10-33% of the energy produced in the enacting state with deadlines ranging from 2015-2030. At a corporate level, the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) offers a legitimate GHG emissions trading forum for companies operating in North America (e.g. Ford Motor Company, Rolls-Royce, DuPont, and Sony Electronics, Inc.). The CCX members “make a voluntary but legally binding commitment to meet annual GHG emission reduction targets” (CCX 2007, quotation in original formatting). Furthermore, entire sectors in the US, notably that of higher education, have begun to champion the cause of stabilizing GHG emissions through their own actions without waiting for regulation. A prime example of this is the 675 higher education institutions that are signatories to the American College & University Presidents Climate Commitment, which obligates its members to establish a methodology and deadline for achieving climate neutral operations (ACUPCC 2010).
Thus, despite the United States’ apparent floundering in the international policy arena of climate change, the country is relatively well positioned to take action on the issue. However, without coherent federal leadership, the US will likely have a difficult time fostering the diplomatic prestige that the EU appears to have in the climate policy arena.
2. CHINESE INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS & INFRASTRUCTURE
With estimates of the exact date varying, it is widely accepted that the People’s Republic of China has recently overtaken the US as the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases. The Pew Center on Global Climate Change (2007) estimates that China’s emissions have grown by about 80% since 1990. Similar to the US, this is not surprising considering that 65% of China’s energy consumption is met with coal (Pew 2007) and China is the second largest consumer of oil behind the US (EIA 2009). It is especially unastounding given China’s record economic growth over the past decade.
Unlike the multi-branch nature of the US federal government, the Chinese national governance of energy and climate policy has a complexity of its own variety. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) of the PRC is at least ostensibly the primary controller of China’s climate change policies and published China’s National Climate Change Programme (NDRC 2007), which is a comprehensive overview of China’s national stance regarding and response to climate change issues.
However, Downs (2008) explains that policy direction from the NRDC by no means ensures action with interference from external and internal parties (e.g. private energy industry companies and high-ranking members of the Chinese Communist Party respectively) being a regular occurrence. Furthermore, the introduction of the purportedly understaffed National Energy Administration (NEA) in the PRC government muddles the issue of responsibility regarding enacting and enforcing energy- and climate-related policies (Downs 2008).
NEA, which was established in March 2008, is now supposed to be responsible for key areas (e.g. development and planning, international cooperation, and general administration of energy policy) related to negotiating any international climate change policy. Yet, the NEA does not have the authority to adjust energy prices, an authority which is still held by the NRDC (Downs 2008). Thus, the PRC seems to be mired in bureaucratic turf battles that have an overall derailing and delaying effect that could be likened to the United States’ issues at the federal level.
Finally, it is important to note that as a non-Annex I country China has no formal obligation to reduce its emissions under the Kyoto Protocol to which it is a ratified signatory. However, in China’s National Climate Change Programme (CNCCP), the NRDC (2007) repeated refers to China as a country of responsibility, which means that it will work toward reducing the carbon intensity of its economy. In other words, China is actively attempting to increase its quantity of economic output measured in GDP per ton of CO2e emitted annually through a variety of energy, transportation, forestry, and industrial management schemes (Pew Center 2007). Also, the wording of the CNCCP makes it fairly clear that China expects much of its future mitigation to be driven by technological advancement rather than major economic shifts (NRDC 2007). Of course, with China’s economy growing at roughly 10 percent per annum over the past two decades with little signs of slowing, it is likely that China’s overall GHG emissions will continue to grow in spite of its efficiency efforts (Wang and Watson 2008).
3. HISTORICAL (KYOTO – 2005)
For better or worse, the negotiation of global climate change policy over the past decade has been centered around the clarification and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The primary tenants of Kyoto involved securing reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from Annex I countries (i.e. developed or industrialized nations) while allowing non-Annex I countries freedom to develop as a form of equity (Bolin 1998).
Since the initial agreement, virtually all of the roughly 200 nations that participated in the negotiations have ratified the Kyoto Protocol with the notable exception of the US. The protocol has spurred the EU to develop a mandatory GHG emissions trading scheme. It also fostered approximately 1400 cost-effective Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects to reduce GHG emissions in non-Annex I countries, of which half are hosted by China (Taplin and McGee 2010). Despite these generally encouraging successes, Kyoto has many criticisms.
As Bolin (1998) pointed out, the targets and timelines for action in the protocol were set out by the policymakers with a limited understanding of the inertia of the climate system; therefore, even in 1998 Bolin expected that additional international efforts would be required prior to 2010.
Instead of relying upon science for strict guidance, Kyoto was developed based largely around political feasibility and international acceptability. It offered generous allowances to the transitional economies (e.g. the former USSR) and offered special exceptions to Australia, Iceland, New Zealand, and Norway (Bolin 1998). Furthermore, Kellow (2010) explains that by choosing the 1990 baseline for emissions countries such as the United Kingdom and Germany were asked to make smaller commitments than might have otherwise been chosen, which were indirectly passed onto the rest of the EU under the European Burden Sharing Agreement.
Regardless of the merits and shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol at the time of the signing, the end result is that neither the US nor China have realized any attributable, real reductions in GHG emissions due to the agreement. In 2001 the US under the Bush administration fully withdrew from its commitment to Kyoto, which was at least partly due to lack of reductions commitments from non-Annex I countries. Meanwhile, China, which was not required to make any GHG reduction commitments as a non-Annex I country, has only nominally participated in the agreement by participating in the CDM program, and it has been argued that much of China’s dubious CDM participation is likely not actually beneficial with regard to mitigating climate change (Kellow 2010).
4. EMBODIED EMISSIONS IN TRADE ISSUES
Though the topic of GHG emissions embodied in internationally traded goods has been generally avoided by policymakers and policy negotiators attempting to gain a consensus, it has received attention from the academic community (e.g. Wang and Watson 2007, 2008 and Peters and Hertwich 2008), and its inclusion in policy discussions has the potential to radically shift the tone of global climate change policy efforts. In fact, Peters and Hertwich (2008) suggest that international trade may be one of the most decisive issues in climate policy.
Furthermore, at least as far back as the Reagan administration in the 1980s, the US has put an emphasis on trade in its foreign policy by working with various degrees of alacrity to open up global and regional trade with partners in the Western hemisphere, the Pacific, and Asia through free trade agreements (Barfield 2009). Also, China’s net exports account for around 23% its total annual GHG emissions for 2004 (Wang and Watson 2007).
Thus, emissions embodied in trade seem to warrant special attention of its own, particularly in the context of US and Chinese influence on global climate policy. Unfortunately, with the US being a net importer (imports accounted for 7.3% of annual GHG emissions) and China being a net exporter (exports accounted for 17.8% of annual GHG emissions) of GHG emissions simultaneously (Peters and Hertwich 2008) it is likely that the two countries will disagree regarding whom should take responsibility for emissions: the producer or the consumer. Yet, Wang and Watson (2007) and Peters and Hertwich (2008) indicate that leaving the issue unresolved in global climate change negotiations will likely lead to an inefficient and/or ineffective policy with the potential for “carbon leaking” (i.e. industries moving from regulated to unregulated, carbon-intensive economies). This outcome could be damaging to both the environment and economic stability in the long-term.
III. CONTEMPORARY
1. ASIA-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (2006 – PRESENT)
In July of 2005 Australia, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, China, and the US, which were later joined by Canada in 2007, developed a vision statement for a non-binding partnership focused on promoting sustainable development and addressing climate change issues (Kellow 2010). The result was formation of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) at a ministerial meeting in January of 2006 in Sydney (APP 2006a).
The APP (2006a) Charter describes an organization designed to share technical and policy information through public-private partnerships such that each of the member countries can build their own capacity to implement clean development technologies and environmental programs. The APP (2006b) Work Plan explains that the work of the APP will be done through industrial/governmental task forces that will research and explore bottom-up approaches. The task forces are divided into eight key sectors: (1) cleaner fossil energy; (2) renewable energy and distributed generation; (3) power generation and transmission; (4) steel; (5) aluminium; (6) cement; (7) coal mining; and (8) buildings and appliances (APP 2006b). The concept of task forces appears to be particularly novel to the APP in comparison to other international climate change policy alternatives, and its research and development focus has the potential to open up new connections between industry professionals and researchers in different countries (Aldy et al 2003).
Academically, there seem to be two primary schools of thought regarding the APP: those that see the APP as a distraction that detracts from the Kyoto Protocol (e.g. Taplin and McGee 2010) and those that see the APP as a useful alternative or supplement to the short-comings of the Kyoto Protocol (e.g. Kellow 2010). Taplin and McGee (2010) argue that – despite the clause inserted at the request of Japan within the APP Charter indicating otherwise – the structure of the APP is irreconcilable with one of the primary tenants of the UN FCCC (i.e. common but differentiated responsibilities) and is designed to undermine current climate governance. However, it could easily be argued that the APP was created due to the poor design of Kyoto.
Kellow (2010) believes that the APP is an excellent exercise in ‘mini-lateralism’ that avoids the least common denominator effect of global negotiations by limiting the discussion to a few key countries. Some of the least common denominator effects that the APP avoid include the lack of action by major developing nations and binding international commitments that are extremely difficult to enact and enforce (i.e. abutting against the infrastructural constraints described in the contextual section above).
While it is clear that the APP’s focus on improving carbon intensity rather than absolute GHG emission reductions is a weaker means of mitigating the causes of climate change (Taplin and McGee 2010), the APP by no means precludes – in fact it at least nominally encourages – nations to develop climate change policies that result in absolute reductions. Also, Taplin and McGee’s (2010) suggestion that the APP promotes a sense of inequity by forcing major developing nations (e.g. China) to take action now seems to be largely missing the point. This is especially the case considering China is voluntarily participating in the APP and the US federal government was able to address climate change through a back door during a time period when it was politically unfeasible to enter through the front. And, even though it was probably not designed with this in mind, the APP also allowed the US some freedom toward the end of the Bush administration when according to Barfield (2009) many political figures would not consent to any program associated with the out-going president.
2. PRE/POST-COPENHAGEN
This section is designed to look at the adjustments, political wrangling, preparations, and fall out of the Copenhagen conference in December of 2009 and address the impacts that the US and China have had on the process and each other. It should be noted that due to the extremely recent nature of this topic the spread of academic literature to date is relatively sparse, and this section should be read as such.
Almost any sampling of national US press coverage in 2009 will likely make it clear that newly-seated President Obama was the center of attention. The lead up to the Copenhagen conference was hardly different though the president naturally shared the limelight with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Congress, and surprisingly the US Supreme Court. In Congress, the Waxman-Markey bill, which is otherwise known as the American Clean Energy and Security Act and proposes a ‘cap-and-trade’ system along side a national 20% renewable energy standard, was introduced in the house in July of 2009 (Pelosi et al 2009).
Though the bill was not signed into law prior to the Copenhagen conference – and actually has yet to do so – the US federal government did begin to act to address climate change in 2009. This was made possible thanks to a finding by the EPA, in response to a 2007 ruling by the Supreme Court, that GHGs were a threat to public health and the environment and were therefore subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act, which was initially developed to combat the causes of acid rain and other types of air pollutants (EPA 2007). Unfortunately, this finding did not carry enough momentum to warrant a total shift in United States’ negotiating policy at Copenhagen or lead directly to setting GHG emissions reductions targets. However, the EPA (2007) does recognize it as a pivotal first step in forcing the US federal government to acknowledge and address climate change.
Since Copenhagen, the US news media have not focused significantly on developments in US climate change policy. Instead the primary focus has been on the reform of healthcare legislation, which has been championed by President Obama throughout the beginning of 2010. China on the other hand has been the center of attention with regard to climate change policy since Copenhagen.
Building upon its efforts in the run up to Copenhagen, such as the research, clean coal, and energy efficiency goals outlined in the joint statement by NEA and the IEA (2009), China has made the news for its climate policies a number of times since Copenhagen. The Associated Press (2010) reported in early March that China is in the process of drafting a 10 year green energy plan. The report included a goal of 15% renewable energy by 2020, similar to its earlier commitment in the NEA and IEA (2009) joint statement; however, the report cited an additional goal of decreasing the carbon intensity of the Chinese economy by 40-45% by 2020 (Associated Press 2010).
IV. CONCLUSION
With the recent Chinese announcement about its forthcoming 10 year plan and recognition that China has overtaken the US as the world’s largest investor in renewable energies (van Loon 2010), the US is swiftly losing the arguments that led to the stagnation of the Kyoto Protocol. These developments could have a range of implications for United States climate and clean energy policies. Factor in the EPA ruling mentioned above, and it is likely that Congress will have little choice to act before the end of 2010. Otherwise, the EPA will be compelled to regulate GHG emissions without further guidance and even the most staunchly conservative Republicans may have difficulty explaining why China is taking the lead on global energy policy while the US is falling behind. At this point the main inhibitor to addressing climate change policy in the US may be the current political gridlock surrounding the national healthcare debate.
Once the US takes some domestic action, and assuming that the NEA and NRDC continue along their predetermined path, it is possible that the two countries that were previously doing the least to address climate change will end up doing the most even it is simply a matter of scale. China has been on a research and development dependent path even prior to the release of the CNCCP (NRDC 2007). The US has a smattering of potential advantages as outlined in the contextual section and is currently on a path toward some version of a Cap-and-Trade based system of governance (Pew Center 2010).
It seems that both countries could stand to benefit from additional emphasis on and funding toward the APP. If this occurs in combination with one (more likely the US) or both countries setting targets for actual GHG emissions reductions or even especially stringent measures to improve carbon intensity, the need for a global climate change policy may fall by the wayside much to the chagrin of EU leaders. Thus, the rest of the world would have to make due with the US and China doing something rather than everything promised in Kyoto and patch together several regionalized policies.
This vision may not sound like a global ideal, but it certainly does seem more reasonable and pragmatic given the current circumstances outlined throughout this essay. Furthermore, a regionalized approach and a breakdown of the post-Kyoto mindset may allow other issues such as emissions embodied in international trade to creep into the global climate policy forum. It certainly seems like such an issue is more pertinent to a global climate regime than universal (or OECD-based) emissions targets since it deals with the interplay between countries and cannot be built upon multiple domestic policies.
In summary, US and China have differing superficial needs, constraints, and goals in the climate policy realm, but ultimately their mutual drive for economic growth and current reliance on fossil fuels result in a similar set of policy aims. As such, it is likely that the US and China (and the competition and cooperation between them) will continue to push global climate change policy towards a more fragmented and regionalized system of governance in the near future.
For reference list please see the accompanying post.
In this post I present to you one of the essays I completed as part of my coursework. Please note that this essay was turned in on 18th March 2010, so some of the remarks in the conclusion are already a bit dated. For example, "the current political gridlock" in Washington has moved beyond the national healthcare debate; however, it has yet to actually reach a culminating point on climate change and energy! On the other hand, a new version of legislation is gaining some traction and the EPA has released its new rules for greenhouse gas emissions permits.
I hope you enjoy my academic musings...
“Compare the roles of China and the USA in the development of global climate policy”
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States and China are consistently recognized as the world’s leading emitters of greenhouse gases. Thus, they will necessarily play an integral role in the success or failure of the development of any global climate policy efforts. However, a cursory inspection of either country’s economic, political, and social structures and issues will make it evident that for either country to successfully draft (and subsequently ratify and enact) a domestic climate change policy would be no small measure. Let alone the effort required to develop a useful global climate change policy that would simultaneously satisfy both countries and the rest of the world. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that attempts to do so have been fraught with difficulty.
This essay compares the roles that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States of America (US) have played and will likely play in the development of global climate change policies.
To do so coherently, the topic has been broken into a contextual section, a contemporary section, and a conclusion section. The contextual section looks at the internal structure of each country, the role that each country has played in the Kyoto Protocol process (from its initial agreement through to its implementation in 2005), and the issue of embodied emissions in international trade, which has been largely avoided in global climate negotiations to date. The contemporary section is split into two subsections. The first addresses the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) to which both countries have been active partners since its inception in 2006. The second focuses on the events leading up to and since the Copenhagen conference. Finally, the conclusion section briefly speculates on upcoming developments surrounding the US and China with regard to global climate change policies.
II. CONTEXTUAL
1. US INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS & INFRASTRUCTURE
Up until very recently the United States has long held the title of the world’s largest GHG emitter with net annual emissions well over 6 GT of CO2e with the vast majority (>85%) of emissions coming from the energy sector (UN FCCC 2008). This is not surprising based on the breakdown of primary energy sources in the US: petroleum 37.1%, natural gas 23.8%, and coal 22.5% (EIA 2008). Thus, any climate change policy developments must be designed to contend with a US infrastructure that is largely developed and reliant upon fossil fuels.
The structure of the US federal government, notably the separation of powers amongst the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, combined with the bipartisan nature of the American political system means that the negotiation, ratification, and ultimate implementation of any (global or domestic) climate change policy will necessarily be a difficult process. In the case of a global rather than a domestic policy, an extra layer of complication is introduced in that the President (or likely members of the State Department) is responsible for negotiating the policy, while the ratification of the policy (enacting it as law) is the responsibility of Congress, before responsibility is handed back to the executive branch (likely the Environmental Protection Agency and several other departments) for enforcement. All the while, other political discussions and quarrels in Congress have the potential (proven empirically time and again) to derail or delay meaningful action with regard to climate change policy.
While the US federal government has yet to enact any statutorily binding climate change policy (international or otherwise), it does offer a number of financial incentives that promote the implementation of renewable energy and energy-efficient technologies (e.g. incentives offered in the Energy Policy Act of 2005). Also, significant progress has been made on other levels (e.g. state, corporate, and NGO).
In fact, according to the U.S. DOE (2009), “24 states plus the District of Columbia that have [legally binding Renewable Portfolio Standards] policies in place”, which require renewable energy to account for 10-33% of the energy produced in the enacting state with deadlines ranging from 2015-2030. At a corporate level, the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) offers a legitimate GHG emissions trading forum for companies operating in North America (e.g. Ford Motor Company, Rolls-Royce, DuPont, and Sony Electronics, Inc.). The CCX members “make a voluntary but legally binding commitment to meet annual GHG emission reduction targets” (CCX 2007, quotation in original formatting). Furthermore, entire sectors in the US, notably that of higher education, have begun to champion the cause of stabilizing GHG emissions through their own actions without waiting for regulation. A prime example of this is the 675 higher education institutions that are signatories to the American College & University Presidents Climate Commitment, which obligates its members to establish a methodology and deadline for achieving climate neutral operations (ACUPCC 2010).
Thus, despite the United States’ apparent floundering in the international policy arena of climate change, the country is relatively well positioned to take action on the issue. However, without coherent federal leadership, the US will likely have a difficult time fostering the diplomatic prestige that the EU appears to have in the climate policy arena.
2. CHINESE INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS & INFRASTRUCTURE
With estimates of the exact date varying, it is widely accepted that the People’s Republic of China has recently overtaken the US as the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases. The Pew Center on Global Climate Change (2007) estimates that China’s emissions have grown by about 80% since 1990. Similar to the US, this is not surprising considering that 65% of China’s energy consumption is met with coal (Pew 2007) and China is the second largest consumer of oil behind the US (EIA 2009). It is especially unastounding given China’s record economic growth over the past decade.
Unlike the multi-branch nature of the US federal government, the Chinese national governance of energy and climate policy has a complexity of its own variety. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) of the PRC is at least ostensibly the primary controller of China’s climate change policies and published China’s National Climate Change Programme (NDRC 2007), which is a comprehensive overview of China’s national stance regarding and response to climate change issues.
However, Downs (2008) explains that policy direction from the NRDC by no means ensures action with interference from external and internal parties (e.g. private energy industry companies and high-ranking members of the Chinese Communist Party respectively) being a regular occurrence. Furthermore, the introduction of the purportedly understaffed National Energy Administration (NEA) in the PRC government muddles the issue of responsibility regarding enacting and enforcing energy- and climate-related policies (Downs 2008).
NEA, which was established in March 2008, is now supposed to be responsible for key areas (e.g. development and planning, international cooperation, and general administration of energy policy) related to negotiating any international climate change policy. Yet, the NEA does not have the authority to adjust energy prices, an authority which is still held by the NRDC (Downs 2008). Thus, the PRC seems to be mired in bureaucratic turf battles that have an overall derailing and delaying effect that could be likened to the United States’ issues at the federal level.
Finally, it is important to note that as a non-Annex I country China has no formal obligation to reduce its emissions under the Kyoto Protocol to which it is a ratified signatory. However, in China’s National Climate Change Programme (CNCCP), the NRDC (2007) repeated refers to China as a country of responsibility, which means that it will work toward reducing the carbon intensity of its economy. In other words, China is actively attempting to increase its quantity of economic output measured in GDP per ton of CO2e emitted annually through a variety of energy, transportation, forestry, and industrial management schemes (Pew Center 2007). Also, the wording of the CNCCP makes it fairly clear that China expects much of its future mitigation to be driven by technological advancement rather than major economic shifts (NRDC 2007). Of course, with China’s economy growing at roughly 10 percent per annum over the past two decades with little signs of slowing, it is likely that China’s overall GHG emissions will continue to grow in spite of its efficiency efforts (Wang and Watson 2008).
3. HISTORICAL (KYOTO – 2005)
For better or worse, the negotiation of global climate change policy over the past decade has been centered around the clarification and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The primary tenants of Kyoto involved securing reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from Annex I countries (i.e. developed or industrialized nations) while allowing non-Annex I countries freedom to develop as a form of equity (Bolin 1998).
Since the initial agreement, virtually all of the roughly 200 nations that participated in the negotiations have ratified the Kyoto Protocol with the notable exception of the US. The protocol has spurred the EU to develop a mandatory GHG emissions trading scheme. It also fostered approximately 1400 cost-effective Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects to reduce GHG emissions in non-Annex I countries, of which half are hosted by China (Taplin and McGee 2010). Despite these generally encouraging successes, Kyoto has many criticisms.
As Bolin (1998) pointed out, the targets and timelines for action in the protocol were set out by the policymakers with a limited understanding of the inertia of the climate system; therefore, even in 1998 Bolin expected that additional international efforts would be required prior to 2010.
Instead of relying upon science for strict guidance, Kyoto was developed based largely around political feasibility and international acceptability. It offered generous allowances to the transitional economies (e.g. the former USSR) and offered special exceptions to Australia, Iceland, New Zealand, and Norway (Bolin 1998). Furthermore, Kellow (2010) explains that by choosing the 1990 baseline for emissions countries such as the United Kingdom and Germany were asked to make smaller commitments than might have otherwise been chosen, which were indirectly passed onto the rest of the EU under the European Burden Sharing Agreement.
Regardless of the merits and shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol at the time of the signing, the end result is that neither the US nor China have realized any attributable, real reductions in GHG emissions due to the agreement. In 2001 the US under the Bush administration fully withdrew from its commitment to Kyoto, which was at least partly due to lack of reductions commitments from non-Annex I countries. Meanwhile, China, which was not required to make any GHG reduction commitments as a non-Annex I country, has only nominally participated in the agreement by participating in the CDM program, and it has been argued that much of China’s dubious CDM participation is likely not actually beneficial with regard to mitigating climate change (Kellow 2010).
4. EMBODIED EMISSIONS IN TRADE ISSUES
Though the topic of GHG emissions embodied in internationally traded goods has been generally avoided by policymakers and policy negotiators attempting to gain a consensus, it has received attention from the academic community (e.g. Wang and Watson 2007, 2008 and Peters and Hertwich 2008), and its inclusion in policy discussions has the potential to radically shift the tone of global climate change policy efforts. In fact, Peters and Hertwich (2008) suggest that international trade may be one of the most decisive issues in climate policy.
Furthermore, at least as far back as the Reagan administration in the 1980s, the US has put an emphasis on trade in its foreign policy by working with various degrees of alacrity to open up global and regional trade with partners in the Western hemisphere, the Pacific, and Asia through free trade agreements (Barfield 2009). Also, China’s net exports account for around 23% its total annual GHG emissions for 2004 (Wang and Watson 2007).
Thus, emissions embodied in trade seem to warrant special attention of its own, particularly in the context of US and Chinese influence on global climate policy. Unfortunately, with the US being a net importer (imports accounted for 7.3% of annual GHG emissions) and China being a net exporter (exports accounted for 17.8% of annual GHG emissions) of GHG emissions simultaneously (Peters and Hertwich 2008) it is likely that the two countries will disagree regarding whom should take responsibility for emissions: the producer or the consumer. Yet, Wang and Watson (2007) and Peters and Hertwich (2008) indicate that leaving the issue unresolved in global climate change negotiations will likely lead to an inefficient and/or ineffective policy with the potential for “carbon leaking” (i.e. industries moving from regulated to unregulated, carbon-intensive economies). This outcome could be damaging to both the environment and economic stability in the long-term.
III. CONTEMPORARY
1. ASIA-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (2006 – PRESENT)
In July of 2005 Australia, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, China, and the US, which were later joined by Canada in 2007, developed a vision statement for a non-binding partnership focused on promoting sustainable development and addressing climate change issues (Kellow 2010). The result was formation of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) at a ministerial meeting in January of 2006 in Sydney (APP 2006a).
The APP (2006a) Charter describes an organization designed to share technical and policy information through public-private partnerships such that each of the member countries can build their own capacity to implement clean development technologies and environmental programs. The APP (2006b) Work Plan explains that the work of the APP will be done through industrial/governmental task forces that will research and explore bottom-up approaches. The task forces are divided into eight key sectors: (1) cleaner fossil energy; (2) renewable energy and distributed generation; (3) power generation and transmission; (4) steel; (5) aluminium; (6) cement; (7) coal mining; and (8) buildings and appliances (APP 2006b). The concept of task forces appears to be particularly novel to the APP in comparison to other international climate change policy alternatives, and its research and development focus has the potential to open up new connections between industry professionals and researchers in different countries (Aldy et al 2003).
Academically, there seem to be two primary schools of thought regarding the APP: those that see the APP as a distraction that detracts from the Kyoto Protocol (e.g. Taplin and McGee 2010) and those that see the APP as a useful alternative or supplement to the short-comings of the Kyoto Protocol (e.g. Kellow 2010). Taplin and McGee (2010) argue that – despite the clause inserted at the request of Japan within the APP Charter indicating otherwise – the structure of the APP is irreconcilable with one of the primary tenants of the UN FCCC (i.e. common but differentiated responsibilities) and is designed to undermine current climate governance. However, it could easily be argued that the APP was created due to the poor design of Kyoto.
Kellow (2010) believes that the APP is an excellent exercise in ‘mini-lateralism’ that avoids the least common denominator effect of global negotiations by limiting the discussion to a few key countries. Some of the least common denominator effects that the APP avoid include the lack of action by major developing nations and binding international commitments that are extremely difficult to enact and enforce (i.e. abutting against the infrastructural constraints described in the contextual section above).
While it is clear that the APP’s focus on improving carbon intensity rather than absolute GHG emission reductions is a weaker means of mitigating the causes of climate change (Taplin and McGee 2010), the APP by no means precludes – in fact it at least nominally encourages – nations to develop climate change policies that result in absolute reductions. Also, Taplin and McGee’s (2010) suggestion that the APP promotes a sense of inequity by forcing major developing nations (e.g. China) to take action now seems to be largely missing the point. This is especially the case considering China is voluntarily participating in the APP and the US federal government was able to address climate change through a back door during a time period when it was politically unfeasible to enter through the front. And, even though it was probably not designed with this in mind, the APP also allowed the US some freedom toward the end of the Bush administration when according to Barfield (2009) many political figures would not consent to any program associated with the out-going president.
2. PRE/POST-COPENHAGEN
This section is designed to look at the adjustments, political wrangling, preparations, and fall out of the Copenhagen conference in December of 2009 and address the impacts that the US and China have had on the process and each other. It should be noted that due to the extremely recent nature of this topic the spread of academic literature to date is relatively sparse, and this section should be read as such.
Almost any sampling of national US press coverage in 2009 will likely make it clear that newly-seated President Obama was the center of attention. The lead up to the Copenhagen conference was hardly different though the president naturally shared the limelight with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Congress, and surprisingly the US Supreme Court. In Congress, the Waxman-Markey bill, which is otherwise known as the American Clean Energy and Security Act and proposes a ‘cap-and-trade’ system along side a national 20% renewable energy standard, was introduced in the house in July of 2009 (Pelosi et al 2009).
Though the bill was not signed into law prior to the Copenhagen conference – and actually has yet to do so – the US federal government did begin to act to address climate change in 2009. This was made possible thanks to a finding by the EPA, in response to a 2007 ruling by the Supreme Court, that GHGs were a threat to public health and the environment and were therefore subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act, which was initially developed to combat the causes of acid rain and other types of air pollutants (EPA 2007). Unfortunately, this finding did not carry enough momentum to warrant a total shift in United States’ negotiating policy at Copenhagen or lead directly to setting GHG emissions reductions targets. However, the EPA (2007) does recognize it as a pivotal first step in forcing the US federal government to acknowledge and address climate change.
Since Copenhagen, the US news media have not focused significantly on developments in US climate change policy. Instead the primary focus has been on the reform of healthcare legislation, which has been championed by President Obama throughout the beginning of 2010. China on the other hand has been the center of attention with regard to climate change policy since Copenhagen.
Building upon its efforts in the run up to Copenhagen, such as the research, clean coal, and energy efficiency goals outlined in the joint statement by NEA and the IEA (2009), China has made the news for its climate policies a number of times since Copenhagen. The Associated Press (2010) reported in early March that China is in the process of drafting a 10 year green energy plan. The report included a goal of 15% renewable energy by 2020, similar to its earlier commitment in the NEA and IEA (2009) joint statement; however, the report cited an additional goal of decreasing the carbon intensity of the Chinese economy by 40-45% by 2020 (Associated Press 2010).
IV. CONCLUSION
With the recent Chinese announcement about its forthcoming 10 year plan and recognition that China has overtaken the US as the world’s largest investor in renewable energies (van Loon 2010), the US is swiftly losing the arguments that led to the stagnation of the Kyoto Protocol. These developments could have a range of implications for United States climate and clean energy policies. Factor in the EPA ruling mentioned above, and it is likely that Congress will have little choice to act before the end of 2010. Otherwise, the EPA will be compelled to regulate GHG emissions without further guidance and even the most staunchly conservative Republicans may have difficulty explaining why China is taking the lead on global energy policy while the US is falling behind. At this point the main inhibitor to addressing climate change policy in the US may be the current political gridlock surrounding the national healthcare debate.
Once the US takes some domestic action, and assuming that the NEA and NRDC continue along their predetermined path, it is possible that the two countries that were previously doing the least to address climate change will end up doing the most even it is simply a matter of scale. China has been on a research and development dependent path even prior to the release of the CNCCP (NRDC 2007). The US has a smattering of potential advantages as outlined in the contextual section and is currently on a path toward some version of a Cap-and-Trade based system of governance (Pew Center 2010).
It seems that both countries could stand to benefit from additional emphasis on and funding toward the APP. If this occurs in combination with one (more likely the US) or both countries setting targets for actual GHG emissions reductions or even especially stringent measures to improve carbon intensity, the need for a global climate change policy may fall by the wayside much to the chagrin of EU leaders. Thus, the rest of the world would have to make due with the US and China doing something rather than everything promised in Kyoto and patch together several regionalized policies.
This vision may not sound like a global ideal, but it certainly does seem more reasonable and pragmatic given the current circumstances outlined throughout this essay. Furthermore, a regionalized approach and a breakdown of the post-Kyoto mindset may allow other issues such as emissions embodied in international trade to creep into the global climate policy forum. It certainly seems like such an issue is more pertinent to a global climate regime than universal (or OECD-based) emissions targets since it deals with the interplay between countries and cannot be built upon multiple domestic policies.
In summary, US and China have differing superficial needs, constraints, and goals in the climate policy realm, but ultimately their mutual drive for economic growth and current reliance on fossil fuels result in a similar set of policy aims. As such, it is likely that the US and China (and the competition and cooperation between them) will continue to push global climate change policy towards a more fragmented and regionalized system of governance in the near future.
For reference list please see the accompanying post.
US-China Assignment - References
These are the references I used for my assignment comparing the roles of China and the US in development of global climate policy, which can be found in the accompanying post.
ACUPCC (American College & University Presidents Climate Commitment) 2010: American College & University Presidents Climate Commitment Website,, Last Accessed 16 March 2010.
Aldy, J.E., S. Barrett, and R.N. Stavins, 2003: “Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures”, KSG Working Paper Series No. RWP03-012; FEEM Working Paper No. 64,, 1-39.
APP (Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate), 11-13 January 2006a: Charter, Sydney, 1-7.
APP (Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate), 11-12 January 2006b: Work Plan, Sydney, 1-8.
Associated Press, 2 March 2010: “Report: China drafts 10-year ‘green energy’ plan”, Business Week, Bloomberg L.P., Shanghai,, Last Accessed 17 March 2010.
Barfield, C., 2009: “Politics of Trade in the USA and in the Obama Administration: Implications for Asian Regionalism”, Asian Economic Policy Review, 4, 227-243.
Bolin, B., 1998: “The Kyoto Negotiations on Climate Change: A Science Perspective”, Science, 279, 330-331,.
CCX (Chicago Climate Exchange, Inc.), 2007: “Overview”, Chicago Climate Exchange Website,, Last Accessed 16 March 2010.
DOE (Department of Energy for the United States), 2009: “States with Renewable Portfolio Standards”, Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy State Activities and Partnerships Website,, Last Accessed 16 March 2010.
Downs, E.S., 2008: “China’s “New” Energy Administration: China’s National Energy Administration will struggle to manage the energy sector effectively”, The China Business Review Online, The US-China Business Council, November-December Issue,42-45.
EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration), 2008: “Figure 2.0: Primary Energy Consumption by Source and Sector”, Annual Energy Review 2008,, Last Accessed 16 March 2010.
EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration), 2009: “China: Oil”, Country Analysis Briefs Website,, Last Accessed 16 March 2010.
EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency), 7 December 2009: “EPA: Greenhouse Gases Threaten Public Health and the Environment / Science overwhelmingly shows greenhouse gas concentrations at unprecedented levels due to human activity”, U.S. EPA Website: News Releases issued by the Office of Air and Radiation,, Last Accessed 17 March 2010.
Kellow, A., 2010: “Is the Asia-Pacific Partnership a viable alternative to Kyoto?”, WIREs Climate Change, 1, 10-15.
NEA (National Energy Administration of the People’s Republic of China) and IEA (International Energy Agency), 2009: “Joint Statement by the National Energy Administration of the People’s Republic of China and the International Energy Agency”, Paris, 1-5.
NRDC (National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China), 2007: China’s National Climate Change Programme, 1-62.
Peters, G.P. and E.G. Hertwich, 2008: “CO2 Embodied in International Trade with Implications for Global Climate Policy”, Environmental Science & Technology, 42(5), 1401-1407.
Pelosi (Offices of Speaker Pelosi), Leader Hoyer, the Energy and Commerce Committee, and the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, 2009: “Building the Clean Energy Economy”,, Last Accessed 17 March 2010, 1-44.
Pew Center (on Global Climate Change), 2007: “Climate Change Mitigation Measures in the People’s Republic of China”, 1-4.
Pew Center (on Global Climate Change), 2010: “Carbon Market Design & Oversight: A Short Overview”, 1-15.
Taplin, R. and J. McGee, 2010: “The Asia-Pacific Partnership: implementation challenges and interplay with Kyoto”, WIREs Climate Change, 1, 16-22.
UN FCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), 2008: Report of the individual review of the greenhouse gas inventory of the United States of America submitted in 2007, 1-37.
United States, House of Representatives, 109th Congress, H.R. 6: Energy Policy Act of 2005 (introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives; 5 August 2005), 109th Congress,, Last Accessed 16 March 2010.
van Loon, J., 17 March 2010: “Renewable Energy Investment May Reach $200 Billion in 2010”, Business Week, Bloomberg L.P.,, Last Accessed 17 March 2010.
Wang, T. and J. Watson, 2007: “Who Owns China’s Carbon Emissions?”, Tyndall Briefing Note No. 23, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, 1-7.
Wang, T. and J. Watson, 2008: “Carbon Emissions Scenarios for China to 2100”, Tyndall Working Paper No. 121, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, 1-23.
ACUPCC (American College & University Presidents Climate Commitment) 2010: American College & University Presidents Climate Commitment Website,
Aldy, J.E., S. Barrett, and R.N. Stavins, 2003: “Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures”, KSG Working Paper Series No. RWP03-012; FEEM Working Paper No. 64,
APP (Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate), 11-13 January 2006a: Charter, Sydney, 1-7.
APP (Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate), 11-12 January 2006b: Work Plan, Sydney, 1-8.
Associated Press, 2 March 2010: “Report: China drafts 10-year ‘green energy’ plan”, Business Week, Bloomberg L.P., Shanghai,
Barfield, C., 2009: “Politics of Trade in the USA and in the Obama Administration: Implications for Asian Regionalism”, Asian Economic Policy Review, 4, 227-243.
Bolin, B., 1998: “The Kyoto Negotiations on Climate Change: A Science Perspective”, Science, 279, 330-331,
CCX (Chicago Climate Exchange, Inc.), 2007: “Overview”, Chicago Climate Exchange Website,
DOE (Department of Energy for the United States), 2009: “States with Renewable Portfolio Standards”, Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy State Activities and Partnerships Website,
Downs, E.S., 2008: “China’s “New” Energy Administration: China’s National Energy Administration will struggle to manage the energy sector effectively”, The China Business Review Online, The US-China Business Council, November-December Issue,42-45.
EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration), 2008: “Figure 2.0: Primary Energy Consumption by Source and Sector”, Annual Energy Review 2008,
EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration), 2009: “China: Oil”, Country Analysis Briefs Website,
EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency), 7 December 2009: “EPA: Greenhouse Gases Threaten Public Health and the Environment / Science overwhelmingly shows greenhouse gas concentrations at unprecedented levels due to human activity”, U.S. EPA Website: News Releases issued by the Office of Air and Radiation,
Kellow, A., 2010: “Is the Asia-Pacific Partnership a viable alternative to Kyoto?”, WIREs Climate Change, 1, 10-15.
NEA (National Energy Administration of the People’s Republic of China) and IEA (International Energy Agency), 2009: “Joint Statement by the National Energy Administration of the People’s Republic of China and the International Energy Agency”, Paris, 1-5.
NRDC (National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China), 2007: China’s National Climate Change Programme, 1-62.
Peters, G.P. and E.G. Hertwich, 2008: “CO2 Embodied in International Trade with Implications for Global Climate Policy”, Environmental Science & Technology, 42(5), 1401-1407.
Pelosi (Offices of Speaker Pelosi), Leader Hoyer, the Energy and Commerce Committee, and the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, 2009: “Building the Clean Energy Economy”,
Pew Center (on Global Climate Change), 2007: “Climate Change Mitigation Measures in the People’s Republic of China”, 1-4.
Pew Center (on Global Climate Change), 2010: “Carbon Market Design & Oversight: A Short Overview”, 1-15.
Taplin, R. and J. McGee, 2010: “The Asia-Pacific Partnership: implementation challenges and interplay with Kyoto”, WIREs Climate Change, 1, 16-22.
UN FCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), 2008: Report of the individual review of the greenhouse gas inventory of the United States of America submitted in 2007, 1-37.
United States, House of Representatives, 109th Congress, H.R. 6: Energy Policy Act of 2005 (introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives; 5 August 2005), 109th Congress,
van Loon, J., 17 March 2010: “Renewable Energy Investment May Reach $200 Billion in 2010”, Business Week, Bloomberg L.P.,
Wang, T. and J. Watson, 2007: “Who Owns China’s Carbon Emissions?”, Tyndall Briefing Note No. 23, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, 1-7.
Wang, T. and J. Watson, 2008: “Carbon Emissions Scenarios for China to 2100”, Tyndall Working Paper No. 121, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, 1-23.
Thursday, May 6, 2010
Off-Shore Oil and Wind
Hello Reader,
This week I turned in my last piece of non-dissertation coursework, so I thought that it might be a good time for some guilt-free blog writing time. In order to keep up with some news-worthy issues, I thought I would point to two articles from last week. The first article discusses recent a step forward in the approval process for the Cape Cod off-shore wind farm and some of the public backlash that has accompanied the news. The second article announced that Florida Governor Crist has removed his support from off-shore oil drilling projects after witnessing the devastation caused by the recent BP off-shore oil volcano. The juxtaposition of these two articles makes me wonder which is the better off-shore option: oil drilling or wind farms.
Given the recent awareness raising that the BP spill in the Gulf of Mexico has been able to offer as an argument against off-shore drilling, it seems hard to believe that there will be much public support remaining by the time this catastrophe plays out. At the very least, it seems likely that new and current drilling projects will be under much closer scrutiny regarding their safety procedures and "fail-safe" devises. After this disaster it seems reasonable to say that if off-shore drilling projects are going to continue, additional safety measures will have to be part of the minimum price of doing business.
The next question in this discussion has to be what are the concerns surrounding off-shore wind farms. It seems that the primary concern for any wind turbine project, which is echoed in the first article, is the aesthetic interference with the natural landscape. In the article, one of the more ethically credible of those arguments is that of the "coastal Wampanoag tribe, which requires unobstructed views of the sunrise for sacred ceremonies". (As a note, I consider this more ethically credible than financially-based arguments such as the detriment to tourism.) It seems reasonable that wind farm projects should try to avoid impinging upon religious ceremonies. However, I would like to question where the ethical balance lies. The main group of protesters seem to be pointing to non-religious arguments. In my mind, this raises the question: Is it ethical to refuse environmentally non-threatening energy from wind turbines, but live a lifestyle that demands the consumption of fossil fuels?
This is an especially interesting question when you consider that the protesters must (or at least should) have some idea of the damage that is caused by the extraction, transportation, and use of those fuels. Whether it is the damage associated with the essentially inevitable oil spills, the death of coal miners, the removal of mountain tops, or the indirect damage caused by emissions, leading a fossil fuel based lifestyle results in tangible damages to the environment and human lives. Admittedly, it is unlikely that all of these damages can be avoided in every case. Furthermore, I understand that even believing and understanding the damages caused by such a lifestyle does not mean that individuals can change their lifestyles alone. However, in a case such as the Cape Wind project where an obvious solution has been presented, is it ethical to protest and obstruct the process beyond ensuring that due diligence has been pursued?
Along the same lines, I have to question if forced to make the choice, whether Cape Wind protesters would choose to have an oil rig 40 miles off their coast or a wind farm a few miles off their coast. While it is unlikely that the protesters will ever have to make that decision, it raises another interesting ethical notion. That is, by refusing the wind farm, protesters are making a commitment to use other energy sources (assuming that they are not planning on going off the grid), which invariably means that the environment will need to be damaged off some other coast or mountain range. That does not seem fair when they have a different option.
Thus, when it comes down to a choice between the tangible damages caused by off-shore oil and the artificial damages caused by off-shore wind, I assert that off-shore wind is the ethically superior choice. Thank you for your time.
Sean Diamond
This week I turned in my last piece of non-dissertation coursework, so I thought that it might be a good time for some guilt-free blog writing time. In order to keep up with some news-worthy issues, I thought I would point to two articles from last week. The first article discusses recent a step forward in the approval process for the Cape Cod off-shore wind farm and some of the public backlash that has accompanied the news. The second article announced that Florida Governor Crist has removed his support from off-shore oil drilling projects after witnessing the devastation caused by the recent BP off-shore oil volcano. The juxtaposition of these two articles makes me wonder which is the better off-shore option: oil drilling or wind farms.
Given the recent awareness raising that the BP spill in the Gulf of Mexico has been able to offer as an argument against off-shore drilling, it seems hard to believe that there will be much public support remaining by the time this catastrophe plays out. At the very least, it seems likely that new and current drilling projects will be under much closer scrutiny regarding their safety procedures and "fail-safe" devises. After this disaster it seems reasonable to say that if off-shore drilling projects are going to continue, additional safety measures will have to be part of the minimum price of doing business.
The next question in this discussion has to be what are the concerns surrounding off-shore wind farms. It seems that the primary concern for any wind turbine project, which is echoed in the first article, is the aesthetic interference with the natural landscape. In the article, one of the more ethically credible of those arguments is that of the "coastal Wampanoag tribe, which requires unobstructed views of the sunrise for sacred ceremonies". (As a note, I consider this more ethically credible than financially-based arguments such as the detriment to tourism.) It seems reasonable that wind farm projects should try to avoid impinging upon religious ceremonies. However, I would like to question where the ethical balance lies. The main group of protesters seem to be pointing to non-religious arguments. In my mind, this raises the question: Is it ethical to refuse environmentally non-threatening energy from wind turbines, but live a lifestyle that demands the consumption of fossil fuels?
This is an especially interesting question when you consider that the protesters must (or at least should) have some idea of the damage that is caused by the extraction, transportation, and use of those fuels. Whether it is the damage associated with the essentially inevitable oil spills, the death of coal miners, the removal of mountain tops, or the indirect damage caused by emissions, leading a fossil fuel based lifestyle results in tangible damages to the environment and human lives. Admittedly, it is unlikely that all of these damages can be avoided in every case. Furthermore, I understand that even believing and understanding the damages caused by such a lifestyle does not mean that individuals can change their lifestyles alone. However, in a case such as the Cape Wind project where an obvious solution has been presented, is it ethical to protest and obstruct the process beyond ensuring that due diligence has been pursued?
Along the same lines, I have to question if forced to make the choice, whether Cape Wind protesters would choose to have an oil rig 40 miles off their coast or a wind farm a few miles off their coast. While it is unlikely that the protesters will ever have to make that decision, it raises another interesting ethical notion. That is, by refusing the wind farm, protesters are making a commitment to use other energy sources (assuming that they are not planning on going off the grid), which invariably means that the environment will need to be damaged off some other coast or mountain range. That does not seem fair when they have a different option.
Thus, when it comes down to a choice between the tangible damages caused by off-shore oil and the artificial damages caused by off-shore wind, I assert that off-shore wind is the ethically superior choice. Thank you for your time.
Sean Diamond
Sunday, April 25, 2010
Thank You Senator Graham
Hello Reader,
If you have followed my posts in the past, you have hopefully noticed that for the most part I try to avoid commenting directly on politics. I have also attempted to steer away from fluffy opinion-based posts in favor of academic and informative posts. I fully intend to stick to this formula as much as possible. However, in this case I need to tread dangerously close to both of those boundaries.
Essentially, I wanted to thank Senator Graham (R) from South Carolina for taking a stance on climate change legislation that was covered by a New York Times article today. To very briefly summarize the article, Sen. Graham has been working with Sen. Kerry (D) and Sen. Lieberman (I) on comprehensive energy and climate policy legislation. However, Sen. Graham recently announced that he would stop working on the bill due to the political wrangling in the Senate to simultaneously address immigration policy and climate legislation, which are both expected to be tough issues for gaining bipartisan support.
Now, you might expect that it is odd that I would applaud Sen. Graham's move to stop working on climate legislation. However, this is one of the few definitive public announcements regarding aggressive action on climate change legislation that I can remember. The U.S. federal government has fallen behind the governments of most developed countries and even many states on putting together comprehensive climate change legislation. Even China has moved ahead of the U.S. in the climate policy arena.
In addition to international and state pressure to regulate climate change in a manner that makes sense for the U.S., the court ordered E.P.A. ruling about the need for the E.P.A. to regulate greenhouse gases (including carbon dioxide) under the Clean Air Act will mean that GHGs will be regulated soon whether or not Congress acts. Unfortunately, the manner in which the Clean Air Act is structured GHG regulation will likely be clunky and inefficient. Read this as wasting taxpayer dollars and causing hassle to business owners and citizens that could be avoided by new legislation.
Thus, it seems imperative that the U.S. Congress address climate change and energy policy before the legislators are side-tracked by elections and ultimately break up at the end of their term this year. Otherwise, it could take an entire extra election cycle or two to implement any effective climate change legislation if it happens at all. In the meantime the effects of climate change will continue to move toward undesirable consequences, and the E.P.A. will continue to do its best to regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act. It seems as though that such a scenario would be a lose-lose situation.
Therefore, I would like to thank Sen. Graham for his tough action in the Senate to bring the spot light on climate and energy policy. Far from viewing this as the obstructionist narrative that the Democratic leadership have (rightly or wrongly) constructed about the current Republican strategy in Congress, I see this move as a bold statement about the urgency of addressing an issue with huge consequences that only grow larger the longer we wait to respond to them.
It is in the best interest of all parties, people, and businesses to have a new set of climate change and energy legislation in the U.S. before the end of the year. Even if you do not believe that climate change is occurring and no matter your party affiliation, I highly recommend that you urge your Senators to ensure that there is new legislation to regulate GHG emissions by the end of the 2010.
For my part, I hope that Senators Spector and Casey from Pennsylvania will take this as my personal request as a constituent to ensure just that.
Sincerely,
Sean Diamond
This post refers to:
Graham Pulls Support for Major Senate Climate Bill
By JOHN M. BRODER
Published: April 24, 2010
New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/25/us/politics/25graham.html
If you have followed my posts in the past, you have hopefully noticed that for the most part I try to avoid commenting directly on politics. I have also attempted to steer away from fluffy opinion-based posts in favor of academic and informative posts. I fully intend to stick to this formula as much as possible. However, in this case I need to tread dangerously close to both of those boundaries.
Essentially, I wanted to thank Senator Graham (R) from South Carolina for taking a stance on climate change legislation that was covered by a New York Times article today. To very briefly summarize the article, Sen. Graham has been working with Sen. Kerry (D) and Sen. Lieberman (I) on comprehensive energy and climate policy legislation. However, Sen. Graham recently announced that he would stop working on the bill due to the political wrangling in the Senate to simultaneously address immigration policy and climate legislation, which are both expected to be tough issues for gaining bipartisan support.
Now, you might expect that it is odd that I would applaud Sen. Graham's move to stop working on climate legislation. However, this is one of the few definitive public announcements regarding aggressive action on climate change legislation that I can remember. The U.S. federal government has fallen behind the governments of most developed countries and even many states on putting together comprehensive climate change legislation. Even China has moved ahead of the U.S. in the climate policy arena.
In addition to international and state pressure to regulate climate change in a manner that makes sense for the U.S., the court ordered E.P.A. ruling about the need for the E.P.A. to regulate greenhouse gases (including carbon dioxide) under the Clean Air Act will mean that GHGs will be regulated soon whether or not Congress acts. Unfortunately, the manner in which the Clean Air Act is structured GHG regulation will likely be clunky and inefficient. Read this as wasting taxpayer dollars and causing hassle to business owners and citizens that could be avoided by new legislation.
Thus, it seems imperative that the U.S. Congress address climate change and energy policy before the legislators are side-tracked by elections and ultimately break up at the end of their term this year. Otherwise, it could take an entire extra election cycle or two to implement any effective climate change legislation if it happens at all. In the meantime the effects of climate change will continue to move toward undesirable consequences, and the E.P.A. will continue to do its best to regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act. It seems as though that such a scenario would be a lose-lose situation.
Therefore, I would like to thank Sen. Graham for his tough action in the Senate to bring the spot light on climate and energy policy. Far from viewing this as the obstructionist narrative that the Democratic leadership have (rightly or wrongly) constructed about the current Republican strategy in Congress, I see this move as a bold statement about the urgency of addressing an issue with huge consequences that only grow larger the longer we wait to respond to them.
It is in the best interest of all parties, people, and businesses to have a new set of climate change and energy legislation in the U.S. before the end of the year. Even if you do not believe that climate change is occurring and no matter your party affiliation, I highly recommend that you urge your Senators to ensure that there is new legislation to regulate GHG emissions by the end of the 2010.
For my part, I hope that Senators Spector and Casey from Pennsylvania will take this as my personal request as a constituent to ensure just that.
Sincerely,
Sean Diamond
This post refers to:
Graham Pulls Support for Major Senate Climate Bill
By JOHN M. BRODER
Published: April 24, 2010
New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/25/us/politics/25graham.html
Thursday, April 22, 2010
Climate Change: A Societal Cancer
Hello Reader,
Today, as I was reviewing past news articles and academic journal articles in preparation for an upcoming class assignment, I thought up an analogy that I thought I ought to share. The analogy is best described through the metaphor:
"Anthropogenic climate change is a global societal cancer."
Please think about this for a second. After I thought up the metaphor, I was struck by its potency. I thought about its implications.
Imagine for a second that you have not been feeling well, so you set up an appointment for an examination at the doctor. You don't feel completely overwhelmed by sickness, but you just don't seem to be feeling as well as you normally do. You go in for your appointment. A few weeks later, you get an ominous call from the doctor's office. It turns out you have cancer. What do you do next? What are your immediate thoughts?
Naturally, you are likely to be shocked or scared. Do you need to get a second opinion? You want to know if it is serious... how serious? Are you going to have to have an operation? How much is this going to cost? Do you have enough money saved up to cover the costs? Will your insurance cover the costs? Is there technology or medicine to deal with the type of cancer you have?
If some or all of these questions were at the top of your list, I would guess that you are not alone. I know that they would be at the top of mine. Now, let's follow the analogy using these questions (or similar questions).
We -the world- have been told we have societal cancer (a case of anthropogenic climate change). It is not a societal Ebola virus. We will not suffer a catastrophic, definitive, world-ending "Day After Tomorrow" fever. However, we have gotten a second opinion, and a third, and a fourth... and well, likely more than any cancer patient can ever dream of, to be honest. The issue is we don't know (and can't ever know - thanks to the chaotic nature of the Earth's climate system and the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle) how serious the cancer is going to be until it happens.
Now, our doctors (scientists) have used all of their mental and technological capacity to estimate what the likely effects will be and what the "worst possible" effects may be. In any case, the possibilities don't look great.
At the best the result may just a few aches and pains; however, this is not likely (a note to bankers and gambling addicts: if this statement excited you, please seek help now!). The doctors have estimated that instead it is likely (although not certain) that if the cancer goes untreated there could be severe consequences.
Of course, the doctors can't be specific about the rate at which or how or where the cancer will manifest itself, so there is a chance it will take a relatively long time (20-80 years in the case of climate change for society could be compared to 20-80 months in the case of cancer for an individual) before the worst effects would be felt and only a few body parts (countries or groups) may be lost. It is also possible that some of the more resilient body parts will remain more-or-less fully intact!
Of course, even with the loss of a few parts, the body can still live on, and it is unlikely that any one particular ailment will cause a catastrophic death on its own. Plus, on the positive side, the doctors have told us they know what the cause is and even given some options about how to prevent the cancer from getting worse!
The question is: "What do we do now?"
Do we wait to see how bad it gets and hope that surgical techniques are up to par in the future? Are we willing to accept the potential loss of a few countries or regions? Do we take our chances of going painfully and quietly into the night?
OR
Do we take some pills that might be tough to swallow and possibly even more expensive than aspirin? Do we start to enact a rigorous treatment process to prevent the spread and even reverse the negative effects of our disease?
In all honesty, the cure to anthropogenic climate change will not be pain free, but it is virtual certainty that the cure will be less painful and less deadly than not addressing the issue.
The sad part is that many individuals, communities, and leaders have not taken the time to fully comprehend the graveness of the diagnosis. Can you imagine reacting to a cancer diagnosis in this manner, even after multiple second opinions? Unfortunately, this is what most people, industries, and countries have done.
Still others have decided that it is not convenient for them to deal with climate change. Many of these people have taken every opportunity to prove to themselves (and others) that the scientific reports are phony and drafted by quacks. In even more devious attempts, some corporations have hired their own group of "experts" to craft reports that indicate that climate change does not exist, is not caused by humans, is not serious, etc. Fortunately, for the most part the worst of these offenders' efforts have failed.
In light of this, I have to ask again: Can you imagine a cancer patient reacting do a diagnosis in this fashion to the point that it kills them? Unfortunately, the answer may very well be yes. Without a strong and global effort that is (perhaps oxymoronically) based on practical, localized initiatives to effectively address the causes of climate change it is entirely possible that this is what we will do.
If you feel that I have oversimplified the matter, you are correct. This is the nature of analogy. It is not perfect. It only serves to illustrate a specific point. If you were struck by this analogy, I encourage you to take it to heart. Please start searching the internet for more information about climate change. Just be aware that there are some people who will be bending the truth without telling you. For my part I can only explain that I have developed my opinions after a lot of academic reading about the science of climate change, and other than my attempts to "leave the world a better place than I found it" and perhaps enjoying a reasonable standard of living in the process I am not trying to gain from this message.
Thanks for your time,
Sean Diamond
Today, as I was reviewing past news articles and academic journal articles in preparation for an upcoming class assignment, I thought up an analogy that I thought I ought to share. The analogy is best described through the metaphor:
"Anthropogenic climate change is a global societal cancer."
Please think about this for a second. After I thought up the metaphor, I was struck by its potency. I thought about its implications.
Imagine for a second that you have not been feeling well, so you set up an appointment for an examination at the doctor. You don't feel completely overwhelmed by sickness, but you just don't seem to be feeling as well as you normally do. You go in for your appointment. A few weeks later, you get an ominous call from the doctor's office. It turns out you have cancer. What do you do next? What are your immediate thoughts?
Naturally, you are likely to be shocked or scared. Do you need to get a second opinion? You want to know if it is serious... how serious? Are you going to have to have an operation? How much is this going to cost? Do you have enough money saved up to cover the costs? Will your insurance cover the costs? Is there technology or medicine to deal with the type of cancer you have?
If some or all of these questions were at the top of your list, I would guess that you are not alone. I know that they would be at the top of mine. Now, let's follow the analogy using these questions (or similar questions).
We -the world- have been told we have societal cancer (a case of anthropogenic climate change). It is not a societal Ebola virus. We will not suffer a catastrophic, definitive, world-ending "Day After Tomorrow" fever. However, we have gotten a second opinion, and a third, and a fourth... and well, likely more than any cancer patient can ever dream of, to be honest. The issue is we don't know (and can't ever know - thanks to the chaotic nature of the Earth's climate system and the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle) how serious the cancer is going to be until it happens.
Now, our doctors (scientists) have used all of their mental and technological capacity to estimate what the likely effects will be and what the "worst possible" effects may be. In any case, the possibilities don't look great.
At the best the result may just a few aches and pains; however, this is not likely (a note to bankers and gambling addicts: if this statement excited you, please seek help now!). The doctors have estimated that instead it is likely (although not certain) that if the cancer goes untreated there could be severe consequences.
Of course, the doctors can't be specific about the rate at which or how or where the cancer will manifest itself, so there is a chance it will take a relatively long time (20-80 years in the case of climate change for society could be compared to 20-80 months in the case of cancer for an individual) before the worst effects would be felt and only a few body parts (countries or groups) may be lost. It is also possible that some of the more resilient body parts will remain more-or-less fully intact!
Of course, even with the loss of a few parts, the body can still live on, and it is unlikely that any one particular ailment will cause a catastrophic death on its own. Plus, on the positive side, the doctors have told us they know what the cause is and even given some options about how to prevent the cancer from getting worse!
The question is: "What do we do now?"
Do we wait to see how bad it gets and hope that surgical techniques are up to par in the future? Are we willing to accept the potential loss of a few countries or regions? Do we take our chances of going painfully and quietly into the night?
OR
Do we take some pills that might be tough to swallow and possibly even more expensive than aspirin? Do we start to enact a rigorous treatment process to prevent the spread and even reverse the negative effects of our disease?
In all honesty, the cure to anthropogenic climate change will not be pain free, but it is virtual certainty that the cure will be less painful and less deadly than not addressing the issue.
The sad part is that many individuals, communities, and leaders have not taken the time to fully comprehend the graveness of the diagnosis. Can you imagine reacting to a cancer diagnosis in this manner, even after multiple second opinions? Unfortunately, this is what most people, industries, and countries have done.
Still others have decided that it is not convenient for them to deal with climate change. Many of these people have taken every opportunity to prove to themselves (and others) that the scientific reports are phony and drafted by quacks. In even more devious attempts, some corporations have hired their own group of "experts" to craft reports that indicate that climate change does not exist, is not caused by humans, is not serious, etc. Fortunately, for the most part the worst of these offenders' efforts have failed.
In light of this, I have to ask again: Can you imagine a cancer patient reacting do a diagnosis in this fashion to the point that it kills them? Unfortunately, the answer may very well be yes. Without a strong and global effort that is (perhaps oxymoronically) based on practical, localized initiatives to effectively address the causes of climate change it is entirely possible that this is what we will do.
If you feel that I have oversimplified the matter, you are correct. This is the nature of analogy. It is not perfect. It only serves to illustrate a specific point. If you were struck by this analogy, I encourage you to take it to heart. Please start searching the internet for more information about climate change. Just be aware that there are some people who will be bending the truth without telling you. For my part I can only explain that I have developed my opinions after a lot of academic reading about the science of climate change, and other than my attempts to "leave the world a better place than I found it" and perhaps enjoying a reasonable standard of living in the process I am not trying to gain from this message.
Thanks for your time,
Sean Diamond
Wednesday, April 21, 2010
Dissertation Proposal: Energy Storage
Hello Reader,
As I promised in my previous post, this post includes part of my dissertation proposal. I have decided to spare everyone the mundane details surrounding my time table and contingency plans. I hope this post gives you a good sense of the need for studying electrical energy storage.
----------------------------------------
SUMMARY
In the context of global climate change, energy consumed to generate electricity for regional electric utility grids plays a significant role. The need for a comprehensive simulation focused on optimizing greenhouse gas emissions on a contemporary, developed electric utility grid through the use of viable, large-scale energy storage is established. A methodology for developing such a simulation and a schedule for producing a study are proposed. Contingencies to potential problems are also addressed.
I. INTRODUCTION
As developed countries seek to modernize their electric utility grid, whether for the sake of cost savings, the environment, energy security, grid stability, or some combination thereof, many utility companies have started to implement or consider the use of large-scale energy storage (ES) systems to meet present and future demand. Careful consideration of present and future grid scenarios and issues such as inefficiencies in traditional non-renewable energy generation (Dell and Rand 2001), the intermittency of renewable energy sources (Pickard et al 2009), the increased use of distributed generation technologies (Bayod-Rújula 2009), and the introduction of plug-in electric vehicles (EVs) (Verhaegh et al 2010) provide a number of opportunities to implement energy management ES systems that reduce the overall greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of a grid thereby lessening the region’s impact on anthropogenic climate change.
II. JUSTIFICATION
Sims et al (2007) explain that energy use currently accounts for 70 percent of global GHG emissions and of this 40 percent is used to produce electricity. Furthermore, approximately two-thirds of electricity is generated through the combustion of fossil fuels (i.e. coal, lignites, natural gas, and oil), which creates direct GHG emissions (Sims et al 2007). As a result, comprehensive attempts to mitigate anthropogenic climate change will likely involve addressing electricity generation and use in some form or another.
Due to the contemporary structure of electric grids, electricity must be generated at the time of use, which causes inefficiencies that exacerbate the associated impact on anthropogenic climate change. Even everyday conditions such as diurnal fluctuations in demand are a source of avoidable emissions (Dell and Rand 2001). The inclusion of ES systems on a grid can decouple electricity supply from demand, reducing the impact of such inefficiencies (Chen et al 2009, Dell and Rand 2001).
Chen et al (2009) indicate diurnal and annual demand fluctuations not only cause generation inefficiencies but also require that generation capacity be over-built to meet peak demand that may only last a few hours each year. With sufficient ES capacity to meet such peak-demand the construction of additional primary generation capacity can be delayed or avoided (Dell and Rand 2001).
Dell and Rand (2001) suggest that peak-shaving and load-leveling with ES can reduce the need to maintain plants in “spinning reserve” (i.e. generating electricity at sub-nominal values) to avoid a short-term shutdown. When fossil fuel plants are operating in spinning reserve, the GHG emissions per kWh of generation is greater than emissions during optimal generation (Voorspools and D’haeseleer 2000). Instead, plants can be maintained at optimal generation levels by running at a constant or near-constant rate (load-leveling or peak-shaving respectively), charging ES systems during low-demand and allowing ES systems to meet demand during peak conditions (Chen et al 2009).
In addition to the limitations of traditional energy production, ES appears to play an even greater role in future development plans and attempts to mitigate climate change. Perhaps most significantly, as developed nations look to integrate emission-free renewable energy technologies with intermittent generation into their energy portfolio (e.g. NCSC 2009), the integration of ES systems on the utility grid may be not only desirable but necessary for the practical and economic viability of large-scale implementation (e.g. Pickard et al 2009, Aguado et al 2009, Benitez et al 2008). Additionally, Voorspools et al (2000) has suggested that studies analyzing GHG emissions associated with “emission-free” technologies need to take into account indirect emission embedded in construction in addition to the direct emissions from the fuel cycle, which is traditionally the limit of the scope of energy generation analyses.
Bayod-Rújula (2009) and Verhaegh et al (2010) suggest that the future of the electricity grid in developed countries will likely involve increased distributed (non-centralized) generation and/or the wide-scale use of EVs and residential heat-pumps, which may vastly alter the nature of the contemporary diurnal supply and demand cycles. In the US in particular mass production of EVs seems imminent within the next several years (Woody and Krauss 2010). Thus, earlier studies that have not consider these developments will need to be reexamined or taken with caution.
Chen et al (2009) have thoroughly explored the state of ES technologies in the present and near-future. Their analysis roughly divides ES technologies into two categories (see TABLE J1), those that are useful for power quality management (capable of making short-term, high power, low energy interventions) and those that are useful for energy management (capable of mediating variations in supply and demand). Though power quality management ES technologies have a definite role to play to play in the future stability of the electricity grid (e.g. Shayeghi et al 2009 and Hartikainen et al 2007), their likely contributions seem difficult to quantify in an absolute manner. Therefore, it seems more reasonable and useful to focus on energy management ES and the tangible effects it could have on GHG emissions in the near-term. Of course, focusing on the near-term means that some technologies are not yet viable on a commercial (large-) scale (Chen et al 2009). In fact without even considering cost limitations, only pumped-hydro power, compressed-air, and certain types of batteries and flow-batteries have examples of successfully developed MW-scale systems capable of operating for multiple hours.
Voorspools and D’haeseleer (2000) stress the need for a simulation tool, stating: “Since it would be impractical to constantly monitor the instantaneous composition of the power system and to calculate (or measure) the corresponding emissions… [f]or studies or scenarios carried out for future or hypothetical developments, monitoring is not even an option and, hence, a simulation tool is essential.” They also highlight the need for “instantaneous” rather than “linear” emission approximations (i.e. not using daily or annual average figures) to accurately determine GHG emissions under varying demand-supply scenarios (Voorspools and D’haeseleer 2000). Despite the need for a sufficiently resolved time-scale, the duration need not be exceptionally long. For example, Verhaegh et al (2010) elected to focus on one week periods during different seasons (e.g. winter and summer), which suggests that this is a reasonable approach to avoid simulating an entire year’s worth of data.
Finally, while a number of energy simulation studies have examined some combination of traditional generation, intermittent generation, and ES systems, the majority of recent studies appear to have optimized their results for financial gain (e.g. Aguado et al 2009, Benitez et al 2008, and Crampes and Moreaux 2010); however, optimizing a system for financial gain will likely result in inefficiencies with regard to GHG emissions (Voorspools and D’haeseleer 2000). Thus, with the issue of global climate change in mind, there is a distinct need to consider situations optimized to reduce GHG emissions.
III. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this study is to assess the potential near-term impact on greenhouse gas emissions of a large-scale implementation of energy storage systems on an electric utility grid in a region with a fully developed grid system. To achieve this objective, technical data will be collected and a simulation will be developed.
<---sections omitted here--->
VII. OUTCOME
This study should fill a significant gap in the literature by combining ES with a variety plausible demand and supply scenarios and focusing on GHG emissions optimization rather than pure fiscal optimization. The final results of this study should offer insight regarding the degree to which the addition of energy storage on an already-developed, though evolving electricity grid can enable GHG emissions reductions. These results should be particularly valuable as utility companies and regulators evaluate their options to meet and develop current and near-term energy portfolio standards.
For a list of references please see the accompanying post.
As I promised in my previous post, this post includes part of my dissertation proposal. I have decided to spare everyone the mundane details surrounding my time table and contingency plans. I hope this post gives you a good sense of the need for studying electrical energy storage.
----------------------------------------
SUMMARY
In the context of global climate change, energy consumed to generate electricity for regional electric utility grids plays a significant role. The need for a comprehensive simulation focused on optimizing greenhouse gas emissions on a contemporary, developed electric utility grid through the use of viable, large-scale energy storage is established. A methodology for developing such a simulation and a schedule for producing a study are proposed. Contingencies to potential problems are also addressed.
I. INTRODUCTION
As developed countries seek to modernize their electric utility grid, whether for the sake of cost savings, the environment, energy security, grid stability, or some combination thereof, many utility companies have started to implement or consider the use of large-scale energy storage (ES) systems to meet present and future demand. Careful consideration of present and future grid scenarios and issues such as inefficiencies in traditional non-renewable energy generation (Dell and Rand 2001), the intermittency of renewable energy sources (Pickard et al 2009), the increased use of distributed generation technologies (Bayod-Rújula 2009), and the introduction of plug-in electric vehicles (EVs) (Verhaegh et al 2010) provide a number of opportunities to implement energy management ES systems that reduce the overall greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of a grid thereby lessening the region’s impact on anthropogenic climate change.
II. JUSTIFICATION
Sims et al (2007) explain that energy use currently accounts for 70 percent of global GHG emissions and of this 40 percent is used to produce electricity. Furthermore, approximately two-thirds of electricity is generated through the combustion of fossil fuels (i.e. coal, lignites, natural gas, and oil), which creates direct GHG emissions (Sims et al 2007). As a result, comprehensive attempts to mitigate anthropogenic climate change will likely involve addressing electricity generation and use in some form or another.
Due to the contemporary structure of electric grids, electricity must be generated at the time of use, which causes inefficiencies that exacerbate the associated impact on anthropogenic climate change. Even everyday conditions such as diurnal fluctuations in demand are a source of avoidable emissions (Dell and Rand 2001). The inclusion of ES systems on a grid can decouple electricity supply from demand, reducing the impact of such inefficiencies (Chen et al 2009, Dell and Rand 2001).
Chen et al (2009) indicate diurnal and annual demand fluctuations not only cause generation inefficiencies but also require that generation capacity be over-built to meet peak demand that may only last a few hours each year. With sufficient ES capacity to meet such peak-demand the construction of additional primary generation capacity can be delayed or avoided (Dell and Rand 2001).
Dell and Rand (2001) suggest that peak-shaving and load-leveling with ES can reduce the need to maintain plants in “spinning reserve” (i.e. generating electricity at sub-nominal values) to avoid a short-term shutdown. When fossil fuel plants are operating in spinning reserve, the GHG emissions per kWh of generation is greater than emissions during optimal generation (Voorspools and D’haeseleer 2000). Instead, plants can be maintained at optimal generation levels by running at a constant or near-constant rate (load-leveling or peak-shaving respectively), charging ES systems during low-demand and allowing ES systems to meet demand during peak conditions (Chen et al 2009).
In addition to the limitations of traditional energy production, ES appears to play an even greater role in future development plans and attempts to mitigate climate change. Perhaps most significantly, as developed nations look to integrate emission-free renewable energy technologies with intermittent generation into their energy portfolio (e.g. NCSC 2009), the integration of ES systems on the utility grid may be not only desirable but necessary for the practical and economic viability of large-scale implementation (e.g. Pickard et al 2009, Aguado et al 2009, Benitez et al 2008). Additionally, Voorspools et al (2000) has suggested that studies analyzing GHG emissions associated with “emission-free” technologies need to take into account indirect emission embedded in construction in addition to the direct emissions from the fuel cycle, which is traditionally the limit of the scope of energy generation analyses.
Bayod-Rújula (2009) and Verhaegh et al (2010) suggest that the future of the electricity grid in developed countries will likely involve increased distributed (non-centralized) generation and/or the wide-scale use of EVs and residential heat-pumps, which may vastly alter the nature of the contemporary diurnal supply and demand cycles. In the US in particular mass production of EVs seems imminent within the next several years (Woody and Krauss 2010). Thus, earlier studies that have not consider these developments will need to be reexamined or taken with caution.
Chen et al (2009) have thoroughly explored the state of ES technologies in the present and near-future. Their analysis roughly divides ES technologies into two categories (see TABLE J1), those that are useful for power quality management (capable of making short-term, high power, low energy interventions) and those that are useful for energy management (capable of mediating variations in supply and demand). Though power quality management ES technologies have a definite role to play to play in the future stability of the electricity grid (e.g. Shayeghi et al 2009 and Hartikainen et al 2007), their likely contributions seem difficult to quantify in an absolute manner. Therefore, it seems more reasonable and useful to focus on energy management ES and the tangible effects it could have on GHG emissions in the near-term. Of course, focusing on the near-term means that some technologies are not yet viable on a commercial (large-) scale (Chen et al 2009). In fact without even considering cost limitations, only pumped-hydro power, compressed-air, and certain types of batteries and flow-batteries have examples of successfully developed MW-scale systems capable of operating for multiple hours.
Voorspools and D’haeseleer (2000) stress the need for a simulation tool, stating: “Since it would be impractical to constantly monitor the instantaneous composition of the power system and to calculate (or measure) the corresponding emissions… [f]or studies or scenarios carried out for future or hypothetical developments, monitoring is not even an option and, hence, a simulation tool is essential.” They also highlight the need for “instantaneous” rather than “linear” emission approximations (i.e. not using daily or annual average figures) to accurately determine GHG emissions under varying demand-supply scenarios (Voorspools and D’haeseleer 2000). Despite the need for a sufficiently resolved time-scale, the duration need not be exceptionally long. For example, Verhaegh et al (2010) elected to focus on one week periods during different seasons (e.g. winter and summer), which suggests that this is a reasonable approach to avoid simulating an entire year’s worth of data.
Finally, while a number of energy simulation studies have examined some combination of traditional generation, intermittent generation, and ES systems, the majority of recent studies appear to have optimized their results for financial gain (e.g. Aguado et al 2009, Benitez et al 2008, and Crampes and Moreaux 2010); however, optimizing a system for financial gain will likely result in inefficiencies with regard to GHG emissions (Voorspools and D’haeseleer 2000). Thus, with the issue of global climate change in mind, there is a distinct need to consider situations optimized to reduce GHG emissions.
III. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this study is to assess the potential near-term impact on greenhouse gas emissions of a large-scale implementation of energy storage systems on an electric utility grid in a region with a fully developed grid system. To achieve this objective, technical data will be collected and a simulation will be developed.
<---sections omitted here--->
VII. OUTCOME
This study should fill a significant gap in the literature by combining ES with a variety plausible demand and supply scenarios and focusing on GHG emissions optimization rather than pure fiscal optimization. The final results of this study should offer insight regarding the degree to which the addition of energy storage on an already-developed, though evolving electricity grid can enable GHG emissions reductions. These results should be particularly valuable as utility companies and regulators evaluate their options to meet and develop current and near-term energy portfolio standards.
For a list of references please see the accompanying post.
Dissertation Proposal References
This post provides a list of references from the accompanying post.
REFERENCES
Aguado, M., E. Ayerbe, C. Azcarate, R. Blanco, R. Garde, F. Mallor, and D.M. Rivas, 2009: “Economical assessment of a wind-hydrogen energy system using WindHyGen® software”, International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, 34, 2845-2854.
Bayod-Rújula, A.A., 2009: “Future development of the electricity systems with distributed generation”, Energy, 34, 377-383.
Benitez, L.E., P.C. Benitez, and G.C. van Kooten, 2008: “The economics of wind power with energy storage”, Energy Economics, 30, 1973-1989.
Crampes, C. and M. Moreaux, 2010: “Pumped storage and cost savings”, Energy Economics, 32, 325-333.
Chen, H., T.N. Cong, W. Yang, C. Tan, Y. Li, and Y. Ding, 2009: “Progress in electrical energy storage system: A critical review”, Progress in Natural Science, 19, 291-312.
Dell, R.M. and D.A.J. Rand, 2001: “Energy storage – a key technology for global energy sustainability”, Journal of Power Sources, 100, 2-17.
Hartikainen, T., R. Mikkonen, and J. Lehtonen, 2007: “Environmental advantages of superconducting devices in distributed electricity-generation”, Applied Energy, 84, 29-38.
NCSC (North Carolina Solar Center), 2009: “Pennsylvania Incentives/Policies for Renewable & Efficiency”, DSIRE (Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency),, last accessed 22 FEB 2010.
Pickard, W.F., A.Q. Shen, and N.J. Hansing, 2009: “Parking the power: Strategies and physical limitations for bulk energy storage in supply-demand matching on a grind whose input power is provided by intermittent sources”, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 13, 1934-1945.
Shayeghi, H., H.A. Shayanfar, and A. Jalili, 2009: “Load frequency control strategies: A state-of-the-art survey for the researcher”, Energy Conservation and Management, 50, 344-353.
Sims, R.E.H, R.N. Schock, A. Adegbululgbe, J. Fenhann, I. Konstantinaviciute, W. Moomaw, H.B. Nimir, B. Schlamadinger, J. Torres-Martinez, C. Turner, Y. Uchiyama, S.J.V. Vuori, N. Wamukonya, and X. Zhang, 2007: “Energy Supply”, Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution fo Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the International Panel on Climate Change [B. Metz, O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, and L.A. Meyer (eds)], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA.
Verhaegh, N., P. deBoer, and J. van der Burgt, 2010: “Distributed Generation: Intelligent E-Transportation Management”, Leonard Energy, www.leonard-energy.org, 1-15.
Voorspools, K.R. and W.D. D’haeseleer, 2000: “The influence of the instantaneous fuel mix for electricity generation on the corresponding emissions”, Energy, 25, 1119-1138.
Voorspools, K.R., E.A. Brouwers, and W.D. D’haeseleer, 2000: “Energy content and indirect greenhouse gas emissions embedded in ‘emission-free’ power plants: results for the Low Countries”, Applied Energy, 67, 307-330.
Woody, T. and C. Krauss, 2010: “Cities Prepare for Life with the Electric Car”, New York Times, available online 15 FEB 2010.
REFERENCES
Aguado, M., E. Ayerbe, C. Azcarate, R. Blanco, R. Garde, F. Mallor, and D.M. Rivas, 2009: “Economical assessment of a wind-hydrogen energy system using WindHyGen® software”, International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, 34, 2845-2854.
Bayod-Rújula, A.A., 2009: “Future development of the electricity systems with distributed generation”, Energy, 34, 377-383.
Benitez, L.E., P.C. Benitez, and G.C. van Kooten, 2008: “The economics of wind power with energy storage”, Energy Economics, 30, 1973-1989.
Crampes, C. and M. Moreaux, 2010: “Pumped storage and cost savings”, Energy Economics, 32, 325-333.
Chen, H., T.N. Cong, W. Yang, C. Tan, Y. Li, and Y. Ding, 2009: “Progress in electrical energy storage system: A critical review”, Progress in Natural Science, 19, 291-312.
Dell, R.M. and D.A.J. Rand, 2001: “Energy storage – a key technology for global energy sustainability”, Journal of Power Sources, 100, 2-17.
Hartikainen, T., R. Mikkonen, and J. Lehtonen, 2007: “Environmental advantages of superconducting devices in distributed electricity-generation”, Applied Energy, 84, 29-38.
NCSC (North Carolina Solar Center), 2009: “Pennsylvania Incentives/Policies for Renewable & Efficiency”, DSIRE (Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency),
Pickard, W.F., A.Q. Shen, and N.J. Hansing, 2009: “Parking the power: Strategies and physical limitations for bulk energy storage in supply-demand matching on a grind whose input power is provided by intermittent sources”, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 13, 1934-1945.
Shayeghi, H., H.A. Shayanfar, and A. Jalili, 2009: “Load frequency control strategies: A state-of-the-art survey for the researcher”, Energy Conservation and Management, 50, 344-353.
Sims, R.E.H, R.N. Schock, A. Adegbululgbe, J. Fenhann, I. Konstantinaviciute, W. Moomaw, H.B. Nimir, B. Schlamadinger, J. Torres-Martinez, C. Turner, Y. Uchiyama, S.J.V. Vuori, N. Wamukonya, and X. Zhang, 2007: “Energy Supply”, Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution fo Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the International Panel on Climate Change [B. Metz, O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, and L.A. Meyer (eds)], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA.
Verhaegh, N., P. deBoer, and J. van der Burgt, 2010: “Distributed Generation: Intelligent E-Transportation Management”, Leonard Energy, www.leonard-energy.org, 1-15.
Voorspools, K.R. and W.D. D’haeseleer, 2000: “The influence of the instantaneous fuel mix for electricity generation on the corresponding emissions”, Energy, 25, 1119-1138.
Voorspools, K.R., E.A. Brouwers, and W.D. D’haeseleer, 2000: “Energy content and indirect greenhouse gas emissions embedded in ‘emission-free’ power plants: results for the Low Countries”, Applied Energy, 67, 307-330.
Woody, T. and C. Krauss, 2010: “Cities Prepare for Life with the Electric Car”, New York Times, available online 15 FEB 2010.
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